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SYSTEMATIZING PUBLIC DEFENDER RATIONING
IRENE ORITSEWEYINMI JOE1
ABSTRACT
Under-resourced public defenders have little choice but to respond
to overwhelming caseloads by prioritizing certain clients-picking which
cases will receive comprehensive defense representation and which will
not. This practice, termed "triage" given its similarities to medical care in
emergency rooms and army battlefields, is a necessary part of current
public defender practice. But how public defenders are deploying the
practice is problematic and undermines the very goal public defenders
seek to advance. More specifically, the common public defender triage
strategy of focusing on a particular understanding of the Sixth Amend-
ment's effective assistance of counsel mandate actually limits the ability
of public defenders to provide effective assistance of counsel. This "per-
versity effect" of public defender triage practice has gone unnoticed in
both the criminal procedure literature and the literature on the legal pro-
fession.
This Article puts this problem into sharp relief by examining four
very different public defender attorney distribution schemes: DuPage
County, Illinois; Orleans Parish, Louisiana; Santa Barbara County, Cali-
fornia; and the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Georgia. Across these disparate
offices, I show how the public defender triage system's formalistic ap-
proach to right to counsel compromises the overall ability of public de-
fenders to provide effective assistance of counsel. This Article uncovers
the need for a more comprehensive approach to triage, and charges pub-
lic defender institutions with making resource allocation decisions more
effective by elevating them from the individual public defender to the
institutional level.
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Public defender Colleen Polak spends a typical workday running up
and down a set of courthouse stairs-"in and out of four [different Mis-
souri state] courtrooms."' Ms. Polak's physical exertion is necessary for
her to simultaneously represent clients in ten different legal matters.2 She
works weekends in the hopes of providing each of her clients with effec-
tive defense representation, but she acknowledges that she makes diffi-
cult prioritization decisions that leave some clients without the attention
they deserve.3
Public defender Ed Olexa's typical caseload for his Pennsylvania
Public Defender Office results in a quadruple booking on one particular
court morning.4 This means he represents four clients who are scheduled
1. Erik Eckholm, Public Defenders, Bolstered by a Work Analysis and Rulings, Push Back
Against a Tide of Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, at AIO
2. See id
3. Id.
4. John Rudolf, Pennsylvania Public Defenders Rebel Against Crushing Caseloads,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2012, 11:18 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/pennsylvania-public-defenders-n_1556192.html. Olexa
works for the Luzeme County Defenders Office, which is considered "one of the most troubled
[public defender offices] in the state" of Pennsylvania. Id. His caseload of 120 clients at a time, most
of whom face felony charges, is described as a typical caseload for the office in "a 2011 report
commissioned by the Pennsylvania legislature." Id.
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to appear at the same time before four different judges.5 Not only does
Olexa have to decide between enjoying an evening off the night before
court or organizing his case files, but he also has to choose which of the
four clients' matters he will prioritize when the court sessions begin in
6the morning.
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,7 guaranteeing counsel for the nation's poor defendants, it could
not possibly have foreseen that such difficult resource allocation deci-
sions would become a permanent fixture in public defender offices
throughout the nation.8 At the time Gideon was decided, there were only
about 150,000 defendants facing felony charges in need of representa-
tion.9 In the fifty years that have passed since the decision was handed
down, the number of individuals embroiled in the criminal justice system
has ballooned to such a level that there are approximately 2.2 million
people in prison, on probation, or on parole.io There has not been a simi-
lar increase in funding, so public defenders are constantly tasked with
representing more individuals than their limited resources support. The
prevalence of excessive caseloads supports the common understanding
that this nation is suffering from an indigent defense crisis." The public
defender function, made up of the institutions and the public defenders
themselves, was created to ensure fairness in the criminal justice sys-
tem.12 Insufficient resourcing, however, has created a public defender
system that is commonly described as unfair, struggling, and even bro-
ken.13 Public defender stakeholders wage a constant battle for resources
and often find their cries unheard by state legislators.14
5. Id.
6. See id. Olexa comments, "My choice last night was to watch 'American Idol' or get my
files in order." Id.
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. See id. at 335 (providing in the case syllabus that "Sixth Amendment to federal Constitu-
tion providing that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to assistance of
counsel for his defense is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that an
indigent defendant in criminal prosecution in state court has right to have counsel appointed for
him").
9. Heather Baxter, Gideon's Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in
Times ofBudgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 349.
10. See Anthony Zurcher, Report: US Prison Rates an Injustice,' BBC NEWS: ECHO
CHAMBERS (May 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-27260073. In 1973 there
were approximately 200,000 Americans in prison, and by the year 2009 there were about 1.5 million
Americans in prison and approximately 750,000 more housed in local jails. Id.
I1. See, e.g., Linda Chiem, Fla. High Court Says Public Defenders Can Shed Caseload,
LAw360 (May 23, 2013, 4:23 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/444476/fla-high-court-says-
public-defenders-can-shed-caseload; John P. Gross, The Truth About How Public Defenders Handle
Excessive Caseloads, NAT'L ASS'N FOR PUB. DEF. (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://publicdefenders.us/?q=node/673.
12. See Richard Klein, The Role of Defense Counsel in Ensuring a Fair Justice System,
NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW. (June, 2012), https://www.nacdl.org/champion.aspx?id=24996.
13. See NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 50-52 (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE
DENIED], http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf. Even the nation's
former chief prosecutor, Attomey General Eric Holder, has commented on the system's failure to
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Often forgotten in the justifiable movement for adequate resources
is that public defenders and their institutions also wage a simultaneous
battle in managing their responsibilities with the available resources.
These defenders try to ease the burden of compliance by adopting re-
source distribution schemes that reflect what they deem are their most
important obligations. The order of priority given to these obligations is
critical because the resulting schemes determine whether limited re-
sources are effective or not.1 Decisions about which client matters are
given attention first, which client matters are given attention at all, and
everything in between are comparable to triage decisions that physicians
use in emergency rooms or on army battlefields. Unlike in the medical
field, however, individual public defender triage practice is not guided by
a formal prioritization scheme.'6 Instead, individual public defenders,
like Colleen Polak and Ed Olexa, as well as the public defender institu-
tions that manage attorneys like them, process clients using primarily ad
hoc decisions focused on complying with the Sixth Amendment mandate
for effective assistance of counsel.'7 On its surface, this practice seems to
be all that is required and necessary for indigent defense stakeholders. A
closer look at the costs associated with such a single-minded focus for
the distribution of limited resources reveals a very different reality.
As this Article demonstrates, despite their best intentions, the triage
schemes that public defenders use to manage the burden of providing
effective assistance of counsel, despite inadequate resourcing, compound
the problems by creating an environment where arbitrary decisions and
resource fatigue continue to limit access to the attorney resource. This
point is particularly salient because public defenders handle the vast ma-
jority of criminal cases, as high as 80% in some jurisdictions.8 The
meaning of the Sixth Amendment lives or perishes at the fingertips of
public defenders facing overwhelming caseloads with insufficient re-
provide effective assistance of counsel. Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Attorney General Eric Holder
Speaks at the American Bar Association's National Summit on Indigent Defense (Feb. 4, 2012)
(transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-120204.html) ("Across the country,
public defender offices and other indigent defense providers are underfunded and understaffed....
[T]he basic rights guaranteed under Gideon have yet to be fully realized.").
14. See, e.g., Jennifer Burnett, Justice in Jeopardy: Budget Cuts Put State Public Defense
Systems Under Stress, CAPITOL IDEAS, July-Aug. 2010, at 16-17; Bill Rankin, Georgia Legislative
Proposals Could Gut Public Defender Reforms, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS (Mar. 1, 2015),
https://www.schr.org/resources/georgia legislativeproposals could gut public_defenderreforms.
15. Resource exhaustion is a serious concern for any organization saddled with limited re-
sources.
16. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage,
122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2632-33 (2013).
17. Id. at 2631-33; John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1215, 1221-22 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Editorial, Federal Oversight on Public Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/opinion/sunday/federal-oversight-on-public-defense.html
(explaining that Orleans Public Defenders is responsible for 80% of the criminal cases in Orleans
Parish).
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sources. This Article provides new insight on the procedures these attor-
neys currently use to meet the constitutional and professional obligations
of their practice.
Part I of this Article details the constitutional and professional rules
public defenders and public defender administrators must abide by when
managing their overwhelming caseload with insufficient resources. Part
II discusses the individual and institutional responses to the inadequate
resourcing plaguing public defender services. Part III provides concrete
examples with an analysis of four different public defender institutions
and the way each distributes its attorney expertise resource. Part IV pro-
vides an explanation of the consequences that result from the triage
schemes the institutions use and identifies the institution with the most
satisfying, albeit less than ideal, approach. This approach provides a
bandage, rather than a panacea, for system funding decisions, but it re-
mains a critical consideration for those seeking to improve the admin-
istration of public defender resources.
I. GUIDING COUNSEL IN UNDER-RESOURCED REGIMES
In Gideon, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel was fundamental and
essential to a fair system of justice.19 The Court noted that government
agents use substantial resources to prosecute individuals and that our
nation's "noble ideal[s]" of fairness could be achieved only if the state
provides the "guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings"
to those defendants who cannot afford it.20 In this real world of insuffi-
cient funding, however, public defender resources rarely keep pace with
the resources dedicated to he government's prosecutorial function.21 In
the more than fifty years that have passed since the Gideon decision,
many federal, state, and local governments have struggled with providing
the quality of representation guaranteed under the Court's interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment in Gideon and its resulting progeny. State fund-
19. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963). The Court used its opinion in Pow-
ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), regarding the historical data of the right to counsel to support its
finding. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43, 345.
20. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
21. See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1, 3 (2002) [hereinafter ABA PRINCIPLES],
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal aid indigent defendants/Is_sclai
d def tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf ("There [should be] parity between defense counsel
and the prosecution with respect to resources . . . ...); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA 34 (2004),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf ("Average
pay in the offices is $64,000 for [prosecutors] and $46,000 for assistant public defenders."); see also
Lawrence Herman, Gideon and the Golden Thread, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2015, 2030 (2014) (advocating
for creation of a State Department of Justice that would ensure parity between public defenders and
prosecutors with regards to pay, staff services, and other tools necessary for investigation and repre-
sentation); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 225-30 (2004) (arguing for resource parity).
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ing decisions on the staff and resources necessary to ensure effective
representation vary widely from state to state, and the general standard of
practice for all poor persons facing criminal charges has failed to keep
pace with the growing complexity and volume of criminal litigation in
22many jurisdictions.
According to national guidelines, public defenders should only han-
dle "150 felonies; 400 misdemeanors; 200 juvenile [delinquency mat-
ters]; 200 mental health cases; or 25 appeals" each calendar year.23 In the
nation's largest 100 counties, public defenders routinely handle an aver-
age of 530 cases annually, which can consist of cases exclusive to one
genre or a mixed caseload.2 4 This finding means that, on average, even if
a defender works every single day without taking breaks for weekends or
holidays, that defender cannot devote even one full day each year exclu-
sively to each case on her docket.
Although larger counties are often the focus of national attention,
the public defender crisis is no less dire in smaller counties. For example,
individual public defenders in the fifty-seven New York counties outside
New York City averaged 680 cases in the year 2013, more than 150% of
22. See Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 Mo. L. REV. 907, 909-10
(2010). States have full authority to reduce already limited funds dedicated to indigent defense
services through a variety of practices because there is minimal constitutional regulation. See id at
908. States will often cover state budget shortfalls for other agencies by setting low hourly rates for
attorneys who represent indigent clients, requiring attorneys to provide pro bono services to the poor,
imposing fee caps on certain types of cases, reducing the amount available for expert assistance, or
even redefining the criteria for qualifying for indigent defense services in order to reduce the amount
of persons who are held to be in need of public defender services. See id at 928-29. Change of party
control or key committee leadership can also affect discretionary funding of public defender pro-
grams. Id. at 929. Indigent defense has been described as epiphenomenal because "it is [the] second-
ary effect of . .. political events and variations [in state funding], rather than a stable function of
constitutional and statutory mandates that closely tie it to the criminal justice system's other compo-
nents." Id. at 908. Until dependence on uncontrollable funding mechanisms changes, "indigent
defense . . . will [always] have long periods of inadequate service [and] systemic crises that are
[only] periodically interrupted by reform efforts . . . prompted by litigation or intervention . . . [by]
state bar associations, [legislatures or] state judiciaries." Id Brown's conclusion is that legislatures
should establish some type of parity between the funds allocated to law enforcement, the prosecuto-
rial function, and the probation or incarceration methods. See id. at 925-28. If his conclusion were
adopted, indigent defense systems would be more stable and, as a result, more effective. Many of the
resource issues plaguing indigent defense systems would also cease to exist.
23. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 13, at 66. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals established these guidelines in a 1973 report. Id. As noted in the above
reference, these caseload numbers are dated, the numbers "were never empirically based" and were
intended "for a public defender's office and not necessarily for each individual attorney in that
office." Id. (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS,
COURTS 43 (1973)). These numbers do remain the accepted guideposts for public defender practice.
See id at 66-67. The caseload limits ascribed have been adopted by the American Council of Chief
Defenders, a section of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association that includes the heads of
public defender programs throughout the United States. AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFS., AMERICAN
COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS STATEMENT ON CASELOADS AND WORKLOADS 3 (2007).
24. SCoTT WALLACE & DAVID CARROLL, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS'N, THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE STANDARDS 4-5 (2003).
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the recommended limit for the highest caseload allowance.25 Smaller
counties, with numbers such as those in the New York studies, are in-
cluded in systemic litigation efforts in order to convey to a statewide
authority that public defense practice throughout a particular state fails to
meet acceptable representation standards.26 Because the Sixth Amend-
ment only requires effective assistance of counsel, and not the optimal
assistance of counsel that an attorney could provide to one client if the
attorney had unlimited resources, litigation meant to increase funding for
public defender systems has proven inconsistently successful.27 Public
defenders faced with these finite and limited resources must then limit
the amount of effort and work they put into individual cases so they can
accommodate the needs of their other clients. Both the individual attor-
neys and public defender institutional leadership make these decisions
regarding resource rationing, focusing on the attorney's management of
cases at the micro-level of client representation.
A. The Theory Guiding Public Defender Triage Practice
Legal scholarship has proposed solutions to the problems inherent
in public defender triage practice by identifying principles for the scope
of public defender representation and developing theoretical frameworks
for individual attorneys to make triage decisions more fairly. 28 The avail-
25. Michael Virtanen, Report Details NY Indigent Defense Caseloads, WASH. TIMES (Sept.
24, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/24/report-details-ny-indigent-defense-
caseloads/.
26. Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of
Public Defense in New York State (Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter NYCLU Press Release],
http://www.nyclu.org/news/settlement-begins-historic-reformation-of-public-defense-new-york-state
(acknowledging that the five New York counties chosen for the class-action lawsuit, "Ontario,
Onondaga (Syracuse), Schuyler, Suffolk and Washington[,] . . . were chosen because their public
defen[der] systems" differ in the size of the communities they serve but were all emblematic of the
problems with New York state's public defense mechanism).
27. See Rodger Citron, Note, (Un) Luckey v. Miller: The Case for Structural Injunction to
Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 486-87 (1991); Vidhya K. Reddy, Indigent
Defense Reform: The Role of Systemic Litigation in Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel
19 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 1279185, 2008).
28. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J.
2694, 2700-01, 2704-10 (2013) (providing strategies for moving political actors who control mone-
tary policies, the organization and administration of indigent defense services, and the substantive
criminal law to allocate the resources and make the institutional changes necessary to fix failing
systems). The institutional changes Steiker addresses concern training and oversight of public de-
fenders and improving the norms associated with indigent defense practice. See id. at 2704-10; see
also Jonathan A. Rapping, National Crisis, National Neglect: Realizing Justice Through Transform-
ative Change, 13 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331, 333 (2009-2010) (setting forth that "meaningful
indigent defense reform" is only possible if system actors recruit and train "a new generation of
public defenders [who are] equipped with the tools . . . to resist [the] pressures" of the existing
inadequate culture of representation and are able to remain in the job long enough to become de-
fender leaders); Robin G. Steinberg, Beyond Lawyering: How Holistic Representation Makes for
Good Policy, Better Lawyers, and More Satisfied Clients, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 625,
627-28 (2006) (arguing that "holistic" representation, a client-centered and community-oriented
approach to criminal defense, is an effective and critical solution for broken criminal justice sys-
tems). See generally John B. Mitchell, In (Slightly Uncomfortable) Defense of "Triage" by Public
Defenders, 39 VAL. U.L. REV. 925 (2005) [hereinafter Mitchell, Defense]; John B. Mitchell, Redefin-
ing the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1215 (1994) [hereinafter Mitchell, Redefining] (provid-
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able scholarship attempts to provide an ethical framework for individual
public defenders to use when rationing resources.2 9 The majority of this
limited scholarship informs public defender systems about the most ap-
propriate way for individual attorneys to conduct a triage practice, and a
more limited amount has been written on the effect of triage on client
rights.30 There is even less scholarship available suggesting that public
defenders must reject triage or risk providing unconstitutional and unpro-
fessional representation to indigent persons.31 Although this scholarship
has enhanced the conversation about public defender triage, it fails to
fully consider the role an institution assumes in effecting individual pub-
lic defender triage decisions. Legal scholarship is mostly silent about the
institutional design of public defender offices and how an administra-
tion's allocation of limited resources might contribute to the further re-
duction of those resources.32
Part of the difficulty with establishing particular triage schemes
among clients is that such an activity so clearly calls into question the
Sixth Amendment mandate to provide effective assistance to all clients.
The very nature of choosing to provide one particular client resources to
which that client is entitled at the expense of another client suggests that
attorneys are failing to comply with professional and ethical require-
ments of competent and effective advocacy. Despite this problem, legal
scholarship has set forth suggested protocol for public defender adminis-
trators and individual public defenders to consider.
One of the most comprehensive resource-rationing guidelines for
public defenders identifies three types of individual client representation:
(1) messenger representation-"merely convey[ing] [any plea offers]
from the prosecution without any real analysis or counseling;" (2) pattern
representation-"quickly categorizing cases legally, factually, strategi-
cally, and predictively by [finding] certain . . . recurring patterns" from
previous cases; and (3) focus representation-pushing the rules and cre-
ating deeper narratives for a client's defense.33 The support for this triage
model arises from the claim that the Sixth Amendment permits pattern
ing a theoretical framework for individual public defenders to use when rationing resources amongst
clients with competing significant claims and arguing that public defenders should prioritize serious
cases, followed by cases that implicate the system protection function of the criminal defense attor-
ney, and finally cases to which the defender has a personal attraction).
29. For a focus on institutional behaviors, see Darryl K. Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion
to Ration Services and Shortchange Some Clients, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 207, 215 (2004) (proposing
resource allocation rules that are guided by the twin principles of priority to factual innocence and a
harm-reduction principle).
30. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
32. See Brown, supra note 29, at 213-14 (discussing institutional design in his article regard-
ing rationing defense entitlements); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Polic-
ing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 895-906 (2009) (dis-
cussing institutional design from a prosecutorial view); cf Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:
A voiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42 (2010).
33. Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1292-93, 1302.
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representation and, in some situations, messenger epresentation for an
individual client and that the public defender's dilemma comes forth in
choosing which clients or cases receive focused representation.34 It con-
cludes that priority should go first to cases that are deemed "serious"
because of harsh and unjust punishments or collateral consequences, then
to cases involving the defenders primary historical purpose of protecting
the system and "making the screens work," and lastly, to cases that reso-
nate with the individual defender for personal reasons.35 Proponents of
this triage scheme argue that the order of priority is reflective of both the
historical purpose and current best use of the public defender function.36
Criticism of this proposed representation scheme focuses on the
central truth that each client is entitled to effective representation and
that the proposed scheme does little to prevent unfair bias from taking
root in a defender's practice. If every indigent person is entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel, a public defender will find it difficult to
properly and formally decide, at the outset of a case, which clients will
receive the focused type of representation, without relying, to some ex-
tent, on unconscious bias.3 8 In other words, formal triage schemes may
help reduce public defender frustration and wholly deficient representa-
tion by helping public defenders feel like professionals, but they do little
to reduce the potential for bias to affect arbitrary decisions and thus ren-
34. See id. at 1292-94, 1302.
35. Id. at 1288-90. Examples for this first category include clients who a defender believes
are innocent or clients who are facing capital punishment. If the defender's limited resources allow,
then the defender should take cases that inculpate the public defender's historical purpose because
they involve suppression issues or state misconduct. The least priority for any remaining resources
would go to cases that resonate with the individual public defender for personal reasons. See id. at
1302. These would include cases where the defender has formed an attachment with a client because
the defender views the defense work as helping the client turn his or her life around.
Other forms of scholarship discuss the appropriateness of triage in terms of how resources
can be distributed fairly. All ethical theories for justifying and guiding ethical choices of distribution
fall under the single, large concept of distributive justice. Distributive justice differs from other
justice aims by ensuring that people receive a "fair share" of the available goods. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTiCE 259 (1971). Theories of distributive justice are concerned with how to fairly
allocate scarce resources among individuals with competing needs or claims and how the total
amount of goods to be distributed can be distributed in a manner that produces a just pattern. See id
at 265-67. Because any goods, and in fact primary goods, include basic liberties and opportunities,
distributive justice principles are useful in finding solutions to the problems that plague under-
resourced systems. Procedural justice focuses on the process in which goods are delivered, requiring
that a fair process is used in deciding what is distributed. See id at 84-86. Restorative justice, also
known as corrective justice, focuses on returning something back to the way it should be. Retributive
justice focuses on what constitutes a fair and proportional punishment. See id. at 313-14. This Arti-
cle does not include a robust analysis of distributive justice theory or a discussion of the other forms
of justice but does adopt the proposition that indigent defendants are entitled to a fair share of re-
sources under the Sixth Amendment. This Article then focuses on how limited resources can be
distributed more fairly.
36. Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1220-22.
37. See Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U.L. REv.
911, 918-20 (2005).
38. See id at 916.
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der the process unfair for clients.39 Whether a client appears innocent to a
defender, or whether the defender believes the state engaged in miscon-
duct against a client from a particular type of community, will depend
heavily on that defender's perception of innocent behavior or unaccepta-
ble police conduct in certain environments.40 These criticisms might be
the reason no public defender office in the nation has formally adopted
this resource-rationing scheme.4 1 Formally adopting this sort of scheme
may reduce the anxiety or stress that individual public defenders feel
when having to make informal triage decisions on their own, but it also
provides a clear case for review for any enterprising litigant looking to
challenge his conviction or quality of representation.
Avoiding the inevitable influence of bias in prioritization decisions
is the basis of another body of scholarship suggesting that public defend-
42
ers should never engage in triage. This scholarship suggests that public
defenders should stop searching for acceptable strategies to provide cli-
ents with less than what they are constitutionally entitled to, and instead,
inform the court when they are unable to provide counsel without incor-
porating triage decisions in their practice.43 Monroe Freedman, a preemi-
nent legal ethics scholar, set forth this analysis and conclusion in his arti-
cle, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders." Although social sci-
ence had not popularized the term "implicit bias" at the time of publica-
tion, Freedman draws on the formative literature by arguing a central
problem of any triage scheme is that lawyers will make decisions about
which clients will receive which level of representation through a lens
that is affected by the lawyer's own background and preconceived no-
tions.4 5 Such behavior or actions would undermine the role of the public
39. Conversely, other scholars stress the need for defenders and defender leaders to refrain
from ranking cases based on the perception of factual innocence. See, e.g., Richardson & Goff,
supra note 16, at 2644. "Given the limited time defenders have to prioritize cases, innocence deter-
minations [could] only be speculative [guesses] based on inadequate information"-exactly the type
of circumstances where implicit bias takes root. Id. These scholars argue that triage standards ought
to be based instead upon criteria that are objectively measurable and not subject to interpretation.
See, e.g., id In other words, defender offices could "prioritize cases based on custody status, with in-
custody clients being iven priority." Id. Alternatively, cases could be prioritized randomly or based
upon speedy trial deadlines. Id. Public defender institutions would then supplement these triage
schemes with established accountability measures that would not rely on individual attorney subjec-
tive judgments and would drastically reduce the potential of implicit bias. See id. at 2645.
40. For community explanation see Grizzard, The Dominant White Response to Baltimore
Shows Why Black Residents are Justified in their Anger, DAILY Kos (Apr. 28, 2015, 11:30 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/04/28/1380944/-The-Dominant-White-Response-to-Baltimore-
Shows-Why-Black-Residents-are-Justified-in-their-Anger; see also Jon Swaine, Oliver Laughland &
Jamiles Lartey, Black Americans Killed by Police Twice as Likely to be Unarmed as White People,
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015, 8:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/01/black-
americans-killed-by-police-analysis; and The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US,
GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-
killings-us-database (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (interactive map).
41. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 16, at 2632.
42. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 37, at 914.
43. See, e.g., id. at 919-2 1.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 916.
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defender in establishing a fair process for indigent persons charged with
criminal offenses. Freedman suggests that public defenders instead use
professional disciplinary rules to avoid any triage methods.4 6
Of most import to Freedman's analysis is the lawyer's duty to in-
vestigate a case. Freedman argues that if a lawyer is unable to fulfill his
obligation to investigate a case or charge, then the lawyer is ethically
required to reject the appointment.47 If the lawyer is ordered to maintain
representation by either his supervisor or the court, then the lawyer
should notify the appropriate disciplinary board.48 The lawyer should
also put forth on the record his inability to give competent representation
because of the conflict of interest inherent to an overwhelming case-
load.49 The lawyer should then go no further than to inform the client of
any plea offers made by the prosecution, without advising the client
whether to accept, fully explaining to the client the lawyer's limited in-
volvement and detailing all the lawyer would have done should he have
not been conflicted out of the representation.so
The scholarly insight to both engage in formal triage, and to refrain
from triage by refusing to represent those clients that would require pri-
oritization decisions by the defender, explore the micro-level triage deci-
sions about every public defender's representation of their individual
clients. The insight overlooks the central role of the administrative allo-
cation of these limited resources. There are triage schemes that are better
suited towards maintaining and supporting a fair distribution of limited
resources because they focus on what injects or maintains fairness for the
51clients of a public defender institution. Choosing certain clients to re-
ceive focused representation is unfair to those that receive only pattern or
messenger representation, especially considering how easy it would be
for unconscious bias to affect those decisions.52 Refusing to represent
46. See id. at 918-21.
47. See id. at 919-21.
48. Id. at 921.
49. Id. at 921-22.
50. See id. at 922.
51. For suggested triage schemes that focus on a fair distribution of the limited resources, see
Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, For another suggested triage scheme that would reduce the
incidence of implicit bias, see Richardson & Goff, supra note 16,
52. See Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1280-81; see also Michelle Maiese, Distribu-
tive Justice, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (June 2013),
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/distributive-justice. Defining the class that receives a
particular resource can prove rather difficult. With regards to the resources of a public defender
office, the class can be the attorney, the clients, the investigators, the social workers, or any other
types of administrative or support staff. Even if one was to limit the class to the clients receiving
representation, i.e. resources, from the public defender offices, such a classification may not be
simplistic enough to evaluate distributive justice outcomes. In addition to the general class of all
clients, clients can be further grouped based on a number of different factors including, but not
limited to, (1) the number of charges the clients faces, (2) the type of charge the client faces, (3) if
the client has a codefendant, (4) the severity of the potential punishments that the client faces, and
(5) whether or not the client is a multiple offender and to what level of multiple offender status the
client can be assigned. Many public defender offices place clients in class groups based on the com-
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any client is also problematic in that it prevents those clients who would
benefit from pattern or messenger representation from receiving even
that little representation.5 ' Also, with regards to either suggested solu-
tion, it is difficult for public defenders to know upon case assignment if
their caseload is overwhelming or if they will need to engage in triage to
manage a client's case. Often, the amount of work that is necessary for a
particular case does not become evident until the case is complete, and
public defenders and public defender institutions may overcorrect, at the
outset, to the detriment of scores of clients who will have to wait for dis-
position of their cases.54 The proposals in legal scholarship regarding
triage practice fail to consider what should be the fundamental goals of
public defender practice-providing effective assistance, preserving the
limited resources where possible, and ensuring fairness in the criminal
justice system for the nation's poor defendants. The constitutional and
professional rules that govern public defender representation provide
support for considering each of these fundamental goals.55
B. The Rules Governing Public Defender Triage Practice
Individual attorneys, and the public defender institutions that house
many of them, do not have unbounded freedom to determine the methods
and means of their triage practice. Rather, they must comply with a num-
ber of constitutional and professional rules that guide the standard of
practice. Although the U.S. Constitution provides a basic framework,
state constitutions provide the legal and structural definitions for the de-
livery of defense services for individual states.56 The American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) provides context for these legal definitions by providing
overarching standards to which indigent defense must ascribe.
plexity of each particular case. See, e.g., ERNIE LEWIS & DAN GOYETTE, REPORT ON THE
EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS 27-28 (2012),
http://lpdb.1a.gov/Serving%20The%20Public/Reports/txtfiles/pdf/Report%20on%20the%2OEvaluati
on%20f/o20the%200ffice%200f/`20the%200rleans%20Public%20Defenders.pdf. Different
public defender offices, however, hold differing assessment of what levels of severity should be
assigned to which class of cases. These public defender offices then assign more experienced attor-
neys to represent clients who have more complex cases. See, e.g., id. For purposes of this Article, the
class will be defined as the general class of "all clients" assigned to the individual public defender
office. This definition is being used in order to avoid the differing penalty assessments a public
defender office may give to the class of cases they receive.
53. See Mitchell, Defense, supra note 28, at 930.
54. It may seem better for the system to overcorrect for situations involving life and liberty
such as a public defender representation, but the costs of continuing engagement for indigent de-
fendants cannot be ignored. Missed time at work or with family and the stress of not having a resolu-
tion are difficult to measure but can have a profound effect on an individual's quality of life and can
sometimes be avoided with pattern or messenger epresentation.
55. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional and professional obligations for public
defender practice, see discussion infra Section I.B.
56. See, e.g., 7 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO
JUDICIARY POLICY: REPRESENTATION UNDER THE CJA § 210 (2015); ALA. CODE § 15-12-5 (2015);
IOWA CODE § 815.9-11 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:147(A) (2013).
57. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-1.1-5-1.6 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 3rd ed. 1992).
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1. Federal and State Constitutional Requirements
While Gideon may have secured the right to counsel for the nation's
indigent defendants, it did not provide guidance for state or local gov-
ernments to use in establishing, funding, or training the responsible at-
torneys. As a result, public defender services are provided in a variety of
ways. Some states responded to Gideon's mandate by leaving the issue
up to the local courts, and these courts, in large part, fulfilled their task
by coordinating with private attorneys on an ad hoc basis to serve indi-
gent clients.58 This type of system is commonly referred to as the "as-
signed counsel model."59 Other states responded by creating statewide or
local offices of public defenders.60 The remaining states opted to contract
with individual lawyers, legal partnerships, or nonprofit legal organiza-
tions under formal arrangements-usually a fee per case or lump fee for
agreeing to assume responsibility for all cases.
Regardless of the type of indigent defense system a state uses, there
is always one particular individual, occupying a particular office, who is
authorized to develop, oversee, and manage indigent defense services.62
This person, or a similarly situated person, is responsible for keeping the
service-delivery mechanism financed and advancing the agency's goals
in an efficient and effective manner. This person will also dictate the
distribution scheme for certain limited resources, whether it be financing,
administrative assistance, or anything else associated with the representa-
tion of an indigent defendant.63 In a widely decentralized court-appointed
system, for example, state court judges control the funds used to finance
indigent defense services.64 Although the judges control the purse, some-
one within the court administrative office is usually responsible for over-
seeing the quality and type of attorneys assigned cases, managing the
available funds, and providing the funding mechanism with reports about
the needs and performance of the indigent defense delivery services.65
This administrator will usually use some system, not necessarily previ-
ously determined, to decide which cases receive what type of resources
and how much of the resources are dedicated to a particular function.66
These decisions will also ordinarily be guided by statutory or constitu-
58. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32-33 (1995).
59. See id.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Id. at 34.
62. See id. at 33, 37-40.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 40-41.
65. Such reports and formal standards are required whenever services are financed through
public funds. See, e.g., Jessa DeSimone, Comment, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana
Public Defender Act, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1479, 1505-07 (2006) (describing the fiscal
reports and standards required under the Montana Public Defender Act).
66. See id. at 33.
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tional authority but will also be subject to the professional and ethical
rules adopted by a particular state.
2. Professional and Ethical Rules for Legal Practice
Federal and state constitutional rules only provide an outline, or
minimal standard, for the adequate provision of services. It is up to the
ABA and other professional organizations to provide context to the
frame by detailing more specific requirements for the behavior and prac-
tice of their members. In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) which, although frequently amend-
ed, is the set of professional and ethical rules most used and adopted by
state bar associations.67
Public defenders are required to follow the same professional and
ethical standards promulgated by their governing state bar association as
other attorneys. Thus, in any jurisdiction that is following the Model
Rules, public defenders must comply with the preamble, setting forth that
attorneys must be zealous advocates, and Rule 1.1, prescribing compe-
68tence. Competence is defined by the ABA as the "legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the repre-
sentation."69 These Model Rules are simply reflecting the historical un-
derstanding of the lawyer's role as a professional who is both retained
but also a necessary representative for the individual.70 Subsequent to
Gideon, the Court cautioned that "if the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the
mercies of incompetent counsel, and . .. judges should strive to maintain
proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing de-
fendants in criminal cases in their courts."71
The ABA's Providing Defense Services guidelines focus more spe-
cifically on defense representation.7 2 It considers limiting outside control
over the defender program its primary goal and orders defender programs
to refrain from accepting workloads that interfere with rendering quality
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983); Jessica R. John, Note, I
Gotta Get Out of this Case: Withdrawal from Representation as a Public Defender, 10 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 152, 155 (2000).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
69. Id.
70. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, A Re-Examination of the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Pertaining to Client Development in Light of Emerging Technologies, ABA (July
1998),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/resources/professionalism/professio
nalism ethics-in_lawyer advertising/ethicswhitepaper.html (describing how changing technology
affects legal marketing).
71. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
72. These guidelines were approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1990, pub-
lished in 1992, and are considered the black letter law standards for criminal justice. For a descrip-
tion, see Quick Guide to National Standards for Indigent Defense, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS'N, http://nlada.net/library/articles/quick-guide-national-standards-indigent-defense (last visited
Sept. 17, 2015).
[Vol. 93:2402
2016] SYSTEMATIZING PUBLIC DEFENDER RATIONING
legal representation.73 These standards have not been adopted by any
state regulatory agencies, so they are not clearly enforceable rules for
public defender institutions to use as either a shield or sword in manag-
ing their caseloads.74 Instead, these institutions must develop their own
schemes for managing overwhelming caseloads fairly and effectively,
and use the standards as persuasive authority. The manner in which pub-
lic defenders practice triage, detailed in the following part, differs by
jurisdiction.
II. PUBLIC DEFENDER APPROACHES TO TRIAGE PRACTICE
Because of the lack of resources, public defenders develop schemes
for providing indigent defense that enable them to more closely comply
with the constitutional, statutory, professional, and ethical rules placed
on their practice. The nature of criminal defense representation is that a
limitless amount of time and effort could hypothetically be dedicated to
each individual case. An ideal criminal defense attorney would success-
fully seek out numerous opportunities to interview opposing witnesses,
investigate the backgrounds of these witnesses and the area in which the
charged offenses allegedly occurred, conduct extensive legal research,
litigate every potential constitutional and statutory issue before the court,
obtain substantial funds for expert witness testimony, thoroughly prepare
the defense's own witnesses, and engage in extensive plea negotiations.
Attorneys would also have sufficient time to develop a relationship with
each individual client so they could obtain important information from
the clients to assist in the trial preparation, pretrial release, and plea-
bargaining efforts.76
Given that legal resources are predominantly finite and limited,
such an idealized version of public defender practice is unrealistic.
73. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-5.3 (AM. BAR
Ass'N 3rd ed. 1992).
74. See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 58, at 37-41. Strategic decisions regarding office
organization are thought to have the potential to drastically change a consistently criticized criminal
justice system into one that is more reflective of the values espoused by the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th
Amendments. It is this fact that led the American Bar Association to include structural guidance in
its Ten Principles ofDefense Delivery. See ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 2.
75. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 631 (1986);
Richardson & Goff, supra note 16, at 2632.
76. See Todd A. Berger, After Frye and Lafler: The Constitutional Right to Defense Counsel
Who Plea Bargains, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 121, 155-56 (2014). This type of client-involved
representation has gained popularity under the moniker "client-centered" representation. See DAVID
A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 17-18 (1991).
Client-centered representation can best be summed up as having four requirements: "l) the duty of
zealous and loyal representation [for the client]; (2) the duty to advocate for the client's [case]; (3)
the duty to thoroughly study and prepare; and (4) the duty to communicate with the client. Jonathan
A. Rapping, You Can't Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform
Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 161, 164
(2009).
77. The harsh reality is that resource constraints are a pervasive problem for all facets of the
criminal justice system. Prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials also struggle with fulfilling
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Even in resource-rich environments, dedicating resources, such as time
and effort, to one client limits the amount of those resources available for
another client. Thus, any legal representation, even for civil lawyers and
private criminal defense attorneys, naturally involves a certain degree of
targeted distribution.7 For overwhelmed public defenders who have very
little control over their caseloads or client allocations, this targeted dis-
tribution practice becomes omething more akin to triage or rationing by
which some clients receive very little, if any, defense representation so
that others can receive an amount deemed sufficient to adequately handle
their case.79
The lack of adequate funding leads to a dearth of available re-
sources and public defender systems, where even the most committed
and skilled of public defenders are faced with the difficult task of repre-
their obligations despite insufficient resources. Even privately funded defense attorneys must priori-
tize the work they conduct on behalf of a client. These other system players differ from indigent
defense providers in the solutions they have available to combat funding problems. Corrections
officials often successfully petition for increased funding through support of "tough on crime" legis-
lators. Private attorneys can choose whether to accept new clients or certain responsibilities for a
particular client. Judges control their dockets and can decide how and when they expend effort
towards their workload each day. Prosecutors exercise the most control in the criminal justice system
because they decide how many cases are pending at a given moment. Prosecutors can also use dif-
ferent case acceptance schemes for limiting or reducing their caseloads. Prosecutors can employ one
of six different charging policies or philosophies in exercising their duties: "(1) a transfer policy
[where there is no screening of the facts alleged in a charging instrument and the case is simply
prosecuted upon receiving information from the police]; (2) a unit policy [where individual assistant
prosecutors make decisions on which cases go forward in a] highly decentralized [and independent
manner]; (3) a legal sufficiency policy [where] (charges are [only] filed if the elements of a crime
are [clearly] present [in the allegations]); (4) a system efficiency policy [where] (charges are filed if
the elements . . . are present without any obvious problems, [this approach] emphasizes early dispo-
sitions and continuous docket movement); (5) trial sufficiency policy [where] (charges are only filed
if conviction at trial is very likely); and (6) a defendant rehabilitation policy [where] (cases are
prosecuted only if a defendant [is determined to be unsuitable] for rehabilitation or treatment. Mitch-
ell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1269 n.172 (5th, 10th, 12th, and 14th alterations in original). Dif-
ferences in charging policies affect the rates of case acceptance or dismissal and the resulting overall
caseload that a prosecutor is responsible for managing. See id.
78. There is a small but significant body of scholarship regarding triage in the civil poverty
law context. See, e.g., Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J.
1529 (1995) (describing "the shortcomings of legal work on behalf of the poor" resulting from large
caseloads and inadequate resources); Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": Triage
Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999) (suggesting ethical principles for screening
potential clients); see also Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60
N.C. L. REV. 281, 360-61 (1982).
79. See, e.g., Mitchell, Defense, supra note 28, at 926; Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at
1241-42. In the public defender realm, triage often involves lawyers who are "forced to spend their
own money or to . . . ignor[e] some issues, lines of investigation, and defenses because of the lack of
adequate compensation and resources." Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing
and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 783, 790. The medical community has three terms commonly used to refer to the distribution of
medical resources to patients: (1) triage, (2) rationing, and (3) allocation. Kenneth V. Iserson & John
C. Moskop, Triage in Medicine, Part L: Concept, History, and Types, 49 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
275, 275 (2007). Allocation is "the broadest of the 3" and "describes the distribution of both medical
and nonmedical resources and does not necessarily imply that the resource being distributed is
scarce" or cannot accomplish all of its required objectives. Id. Rationing "implies that the available
resources are not sufficient to satisfy all needs or wants" and that "some system or method is being
used to guide this distribution." Id. Triage "refer[s] to any decision about allocation of a scarce ...
resource." Id.
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senting significantly more people than the available resources make n-
tirely possible.80 Individual public defenders and public defender admin-
istrators recognize that their exorbitant caseloads do not absolve them
from using every tool at their disposal to advance a fair criminal process
for their clients. State criminal courts in many overburdened systems
closely mirror the chaos that is present on army battlefields.8' The court-
rooms are filled with people constantly streaming in or standing about,
and the public defenders have an endless flow of cases and people to
manage.82 Public defenders use triage to make this chaos more managea-
ble. The attorneys identify which cases or clients are most "deserving" of
their attention and quickly obtain plea agreements or proceed to trial less
than ideally prepared for the others.83 This action frees or reserves the
limited resources at the attorney's disposal for the case the attorney has
prioritized. In other words, this public defender triage practice can deny
certain clients core defense functions, such as factual investigation into
guilt or innocence, in order to focus attention on the clients the individual
public defender or the public defender office deems more of a priority.
Triage occurs at both the individual and institutional levels, each with
their own unique characteristics as described below. Individual public
defenders and public defender institutions use a variety of factors to
guide their triage practices, but they have yet to adopt a model that takes
into account legal, resource-based, and bias-reducing requirements.
A. Individual Attorney Triage
Although triage has become an accepted policy and procedure in the
medical community, there is currently "no systemic ethic or approach for
guiding" triage in public defender practice.84 Instead, individual public
80. Former Attorney General Eric Holder ascribed the deficiencies in public defenders to
funding as well when he commented that the failure of the nation to fully realize the mandates under
Gideon are due in large part to the reality that "[a]cross the country, public defender offices and
other indigent defense providers are underfunded and understaffed." Holder, supra note 13.
81. See Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1242.
82. Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1240-41. Misdemeanor courts in Florida routinely
process with a guilty plea "in three minutes or less." John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, Justice is
Swift as Petty Crimes Clog Courts, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2014, 10:33 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-is-swift-as-petty-crimes-clog-courts-1417404782. District court
judges in Detroit have an average of "100 misdemeanor cases on [their] docket" each day, about
"one every four minutes." Id. "In a Houston courtroom," defendants would approach the judge "in
groups of... nine" to enter a plea and receive a sentence, some "in less than 30 seconds." Id.
83. Richardson & Goff, supra note 16, at 2632. Whether or not a client is more "deserving"
depends primarily on the defender's personal assessment. See discussion supra Section I.B (discuss-
ing implicit bias in public defender triage); see also Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1241.
84. Mitchell, Redefining, supra note 28, at 1247; Richardson & Goff, supra note 16, at 2632.
Charts providing a continuum of triage scenarios and rules for administering medical attention are
studied and learned by medical students and then followed by these students when they become
licensed doctors. See Iserson & Moskop, supra note 79, at 276. Triage has become an accepted
policy and procedure in the medical context when it comes to emergency caregiving and other envi-
ronments deprived of abundant, or even adequate, resources. The presence of these policies and
training demonstrate the amount of attention medical researchers have paid to discerning the best
method of providing services as consistent with the Hippocratic Oath as possible when overwhelm-
ing need and limited resources render strict adherence to the Hippocratic Oath impossible. See Erich
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defenders incorporate triage into their practice informally and, often, on
an ad hoc basis.85 The informal nature of this resource-rationing creates
ethical and professional practice problems and undermines the historical
purpose of the defense attorney. Individual public defenders like those
identified in this Article's introduction, Polack and Olexa, engage in spe-
cific triage decisions whereby they focus their attention on particular
clients at the expense of others. They have little choice but to do so when
they are faced with multiple clients in need at the same time. These types
of prioritization decisions are problematic because they do not consider
all of the fundamental goals of the public defender and, thus, limit the
fair process for the individual clients.
B. Institutional and Organizational Design
Public defender institutions customarily respond to overwhelming
caseloads in one of three ways. A public defender office can decline any
appointments that bring its caseloads up to a level that would render ef-
fective assistance of counsel impossible.86 There has been some judicial
and legislative support for this type of action in states where the public
defenders office declined appointment of cases upon reaching a number
the office considered untenable.87 Such action, however, is usually met
with opposition, or even outright rejection, by a court or funding authori-
ty. For example, the Missouri Supreme Court recently held "that the
[Missouri Public Defender] [C]ommission has the authority to declare
[itself] unavailab[le]" for case appointment if caseloads are excessive.8 9
Within three days of the court's opinion, the Missouri Association of
H. Loewy, Oaths for Physicians - Necessary Protection or Elaborate Hoax?, 9 MEDGENMED 7, 7
(2007). Although the Hippocratic Oath is not a legal requirement, almost 98% of doctors swear to it
or a similar code of professional and personal conduct when graduating from medical school. See
id; Robert D. Orr et al., Use of the Hippocratic Oath: A Review of Twentieth Century Practice and a
Content Analysis of Oaths Administered in Medical Schools in the U.S. and Canada in 1993, 8 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 377, 379 (1997). Regardless of the specific title of the oath, it provides general
and moral guidance for each graduate during his or her practice of medicine. See Loewy, supra.
Although the Sixth Amendment cannot properly be considered a discretionary oath, the oaths medi-
cal students take upon graduation to preserve life whenever possible do place an ethical and moral
mandate on their practice much like the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel places on public
defenders.
85. Triage occurs when micro-allocation decisions are made about specific individuals on the
direct representation or contact level. See Tremblay, supra note 78, at 2482. There is a large body of
literature concerning the rationing of resources defined as triage, but the literature is primarily con-
cerned with the healthcare industry.
86. See Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and
Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 473, 501.
87. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ll/09/us/09defender.html?_r-0 (providing that
public defender offices in seven states were refusing to accept new case appointments or suing to
limit them).
88. See id.; see also Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So.3d 261, 264-
65 (Fla. 2013).
89. David Carroll, MO Supreme Court Rules that Public Defense Commission Can Decline
Cases, SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2012), http://sixthamendment.org/mo-supreme-court-rules-that-
public-defense-commission-can-decline-cases/.
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Prosecuting Attorneys responded with a press statement declaring that
the public defender system is not in a caseload crisis, using a U.S. De-
partment of Justice report as support for its assertion that the court's de-
. . 90
cisions were erroneous.
"A second approach [public] defender [institutions can use when
faced with overwhelming caseloads] is to bring a civil rights action alleg-
ing that, due to excessive caseload[s]," the program cannot provide effec-
tive assistance of counsel.91 Despite the prevalence of complaints about
public defender institutions, few public defender institutions have exer-
cised this option.9 2 Although the last fifteen years have witnessed mas-
sive institutional change to correct system-wide public defender defi-
ciencies, very few have been the result of civil rights litigation. Since the
year 2000, twelve states have enacted new legislation governing the pro-
vision of indigent defense services: "North Carolina in 2000; Oregon and
Texas in 2001; Georgia in 2003; Virginia in 2004; Montana, North Da-
kota, and South Carolina in 2005; . . . Louisiana in 2007;" Alabama in
2011; and New Mexico and Michigan in 2013.93 Ten of the twelve states
experienced new legislation that established a statewide commission
agency, headed by either a state public defender or state director with
authority over all indigent defense services in the state.94 The remaining
two, Georgia and Texas, enacted statutes that created commissions with
90. See Mo. Ass'n of Prosecuting Att'ys, Statement of MAPA President Bob McCulloch in
Response to Supreme Court of Missouri Opinion in Public Defender Case (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://sixthamendment.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/MAPA-Response-to-Public-Defender-
Caseload-Decision.pdf; see generally State ex. rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm'n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d
592 (Mo. 2012).
91. Mounts, supra note 86, at 502.
92. See id. at 502-03; see, e.g., NYCLU Press Release, supra note 26 (describing New York
litigation); discussion infra notes 96, 128 (describing Georgia litigation).
93. Norman Lefstein, The Movement Towards Indigent Defense Reform: Louisiana and Other
States, 9 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 125, 126 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see also David Carroll, A Birds-
Eye View of Independent Commissions in the 50 States, SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2013) [herein-
after Carroll, 50 States], http://sixthamendment.org/a-birds-eye-view-of-independent-commissions-
in-the-50-states/; David Carroll, Alabama Reforms Spark Expanded Use of Public Defender Model,
SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://sixthamendment.org/alabama-reforms-spark-expanded-
use-of-public-defender-model/; David Carroll, Michigan Passes Public Defense Reform Legislation,
SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (June 19, 2013), http://sixthamendment.org/michigan-passes-public-defense-
reform-legislation/. "Prior to [the year] 2000, twenty-eight states [had] enacted legislation that estab-
lished ... [a] statewide entity responsib[le] for [governing or providing] indigent defense services."
Lefstein, supra, at 125. Five of these states enacted their legislation in the 1990s: "Arkansas, Louisi-
ana, Nebraska, Oklahoma and South Carolina." Id at 125 & n.3. Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Wisconsin, Wyoming, West Virginia, and Vermont enacted their
legislation in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 125 & n.4. The remaining twenty-two states had a state
appellate commission or agency with authority over indigent defense services "or, in some cases, no
statewide structure . . . [for] indigent defense." Id at 126. Eight of the twenty-eight states with indi-
gent defense legislation enacted before the year 2000 had state commissions or boards that exercised
"only partial authority over indigent defense services." Id The entity created by legislation in the
remaining twenty states had full authority over the provision of indigent defense services in the state
and all but one of these state indigent defender systems "was headed by a [single] staff person with
the title of state public defender." Id. For additional state information, see Carroll, 50 States, supra.
94. See Carroll, 50 States, supra note 93.
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only partial authority over indigent defense services.95 This renewed ef-
fort to improve criminal defense services for the poor in these states can
be attributed to a number of different instigators, but in large part, studies
on the shortcomings of each state's indigent defense system and litiga-
tion, or the threat of litigation, caused legislatures to recognize that the
systems in their jurisdictions needed thorough and extensive reform.96
Some public defender offices use a third approach to overwhelming
caseloads, which is "more [aptly] described as a nonresponse."97 This
approach to exorbitant caseloads is simply "making do," and "depend[s]
on [S]ixth [A]mendment challenges on appeal or collateral relief . .. to
remedy any specific instances of ineffective representation."9 8 It is this
third response that is the focus of this Article. Academics develop stand-
ards and guidelines for providing effective assistance of counsel, despite
the prevalence of extraordinarily high caseloads.99 Practitioners develop
personal guidelines for managing caseloads and will sometimes docu-
ment the actions or resources that are missing from their representation
to aid their clients in any resulting appellate briefs.00 These responses
prove disappointing, however, because of the difficulty in prevailing on
95. Id.
96. For example, the state of Georgia's most recent reform efforts can be traced to a 1988
Eleventh Circuit decision in Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988). At the time of the
litigation in Luckey, Georgia used a county-based system of indigent defense. See id. at 1013. In
Luckey, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the Strickland-Cronic standard for reversal of individu-
al conviction was "inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief' because the Sixth
Amendment protects rights that are not necessarily conveyed through the outcome of a particular
trial. Id. at 1017. The appellate court held that the appropriate standard was to look at "the likelihood
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law." Id. (quoting
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). The Eleventh Circuit declined to exercise its equita-
ble jurisdiction to hear the case on the grounds of Young abstention, which prevents federal courts
from issuing rulings that would interfere with ongoing state criminal prosecutions, but the portion of
the ruling concerning prospective relief led to a wave of injunction-centered Section 1983 civil class
action suits. Id. at 1015-16.
These suits, which arose in a number of states including Georgia, Montana, and Louisi-
ana, sought broad reform of state and local indigence systems alleging that indigent defendants were
denied constitutionally guaranteed counsel because of a number of deficiencies like excessive case-
loads, lack of resources and support staff, inadequate facilities, and lack of standards and oversight.
None of these lawsuits resulted in a detailed injunctive order by a court, but they did assist in mov-
ing states down the road towards reform. For example, the 1999 Consent Order issued with Fulton
County, GA, encouraged threats of other lawsuits in Georgia. Reddy, supra note 27, at 21. In 2003,
the Georgia State Legislature responded in part to legislative efforts by passing the Georgia Indigent
Defense Act. Id. at 21-22. Similarly, White v. Governor Martz, was filed in 2002 asserting a claim
against Montana's indigent defense system. No. CDV 02-133, 2002 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1897, at *2
(1st Jud. Dist. Ct. of Mont. Dec. 3, 2002). The American Civil Liberties Union agreed to postpone
the lawsuit until the state of Montana could pursue a legislative solution. See Reddy, supra note 27,
at 49. The suit was withdrawn when the state passed the Montana Public Defender Act in 2005. Id.
97. Mounts, supra note 86, at 502.
98. Id. Public defenders use a variation to the nonresponse option by making an affirmative
record in a systematic fashion of each individual case where ineffective representation has occurred.
Id.
99. See discussion supra Section L.A.
100. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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Sixth Amendment claims. These responses have resulted in little system-
ic, long-lasting relief.' 1o
1. Limiting the Public Defender Responsibility
Some of the public defender offices that use a making do approach
to insufficient resources have either semi-formally or formally incorpo-
rated triage principles into their institutional organization and design.
The historical focus on institutional design triage for public defender
offices has been on either limiting the types of cases an office will accept
responsibility for or restricting the degree of representation by individual
attorneys. These solutions have proven ineffective for a number of rea-
sons. First and foremost, funding allocations closely follow the decisions
that public defender administrators make, limiting the extent of their
responsibility.102 An indigent defendant is still entitled to state-funded
representation, even when an institutional defender office declines to
assume responsibility for that client's case.103 The state must still pay for
that client's representation, whether or not the client receives representa-
tion from a local nonprofit or a private attorney selected by the courts.
Payment for this representation will come from the funds allocated to the
indigent defense function.10 Thus, declining to represent certain types of
cases or charged offenses does little to reduce the strain on the limited
101. See EMILY M. WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA
EXONERATION CASES I (2010),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/InnocenceProject IACReport.pdf. This 2010 report exam-
ines the role of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the first 255 people exonerated through
DNA evidence. Id. at 3. There are now 334 exonerated persons, but the report does not include an
analysis of the 79 people exonerated since the report was commissioned. See The Cases: DNA Ex-
oneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment
(last visited Jan. 1, 2016). Of these first 255 DNA exonerations, 54 raised ineffective assistance of
counsel claims (about I in 5). WEST, supra, at 3. Approximately 81% of these ineffective assistance
of counsel claims were rejected. Id. Only 7 of the 54 who raised such claims had their ineffective
assistance of counsel claims granted (6 had convictions reversed and I received new counsel). Id. In
3 of the remaining 51, the reviewing court found that the performance was deficient but not prejudi-
cial or remanded the case to lower courts for further review. Id. There has been great variation in the
substance of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought by these exonerated persons, but
the most common claim asserted in the appellate briefings was failure to present defense witnesses,
failure to have some type of expert testing done, failure to object to prosecutor's evidence, and
failure to interview witness in preparation for trial or cross examine witnesses. Id. at 4.
102. See HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, STATE, COUNTY AND
LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008 5 (2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aidindigent defendants/Is-sclai
d def expenditures fy8.authcheckdam.pdf.
103. There is an argument amongst the attorneys that constitute the public defense bar that a
client cannot ever permanently waive his right to state funded counsel. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Utah
Court Strips Criminal of Right to Counsel, and Some Lawyers Object, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2015, at
A18.
104. The state has an obligation to provide counsel to indigent defendants risking incarceration
with few exceptions. Each state has the freedom to decide how it will dispense the funds allotted to
fulfill that obligation but they must still fulfill the mandate. There has been concern about how states
fund certain methods. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, RATIONING JUSTICE: THE
UNDERFUNDING OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS 9 (2013),
https://www.nacdl.org/reports/gideonat50/rationingjustice/.
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resources. It simply encourages the funding authority to reallocate the
funds deemed necessary for representation of those cases or charged of-
fenses from the public defender organization to the newly obligated
mode of representation.'o0
For example, some offices, such as the Orleans Public Defenders in
New Orleans, Louisiana, respond to limited funding by declining to han-
dle juvenile cases and farming that responsibility out to a regional non-
profit.10 6 This differs from other public defender offices in the same state,
such as the Baton Rouge Public Defenders Office in Baton Rouge, Loui-
siana, which handles both adult and juvenile cases.'o7 As a consequence,
the state funding authority distributes the funds deemed necessary for
juvenile representation to the organizations that assumed responsibility
for juvenile representation, whether it was the nonprofit in the case of
Orleans or the Baton Rouge Public Defender Office example.08 Declin-
ing to represent certain types of cases in response to insufficient funding
actually proves an ineffective solution to triage needs because the public
defender institution loses the funding that would ordinarily be dedicated
to that legal responsibility.109 Shrinking the pool of available resources
105. Cf Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Reforming Indigent Defense: How Free
Market Principles Can Help to Fix a Broken System, POL'Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 1, 2010, at 11-13
(suggesting that states provide various options for fulfilling its mandate to provide counsel to the
nation's poor defendants).
106. LEWIS & GOYETTE, supra note 52, at 3, 6.
107. LA. PUB. DEF. BD., LPDB 2014 ANNUAL BOARD REPORT 382 (2015),
http://lpdb.1a.gov/Serving%2OThe%2OPublic/Reports/txtfiles/pdf/2014%20LPDB%20Annual%2ORe
port.pdf; About Us, EAST BATON ROUGE OFF. PUB. DEFENDER,
http://www.ebrpublicdefender.org/contact/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
108. See id. at 19, 52-53. The same analysis holds true for capital cases. Until the year 2013,
the Orleans Public Defenders also declined to assume responsibility for representing indigent people
charged with capital offenses. See LEWIS & GOYETTE, supra note 52, at 6. Capital cases that arose in
the parish were handled by a statewide nonprofit organization. Id. The Baton Rouge Public Defend-
ers did assume responsibility for capital cases and the difference in funding amounts reflected that as
the capital funds were taken from a different pot of money. It is true that both juvenile and capital
cases require specialized skills. Recent Supreme Court case law has used newly available research
on adolescent development to require additional responsibilities of both lawyers and courts dealing
with juveniles facing certain adult charges. See, e.g., Michael Barbee, Comment, Juveniles Are
Different: Juvenile Life Without Parole After Graham v. Florida, 81 MIsS. L.J. 299, 317 (2011).
Supreme Court jurisprudence underscores the claim that "death is different." See, e.g., Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("[T]he penalty of death is different in kind from any other pun-
ishment imposed under our system of criminal justice."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-87
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that the death penalty is a "unique punishment in the
United States"). The American Bar Association has also issued death penalty guidelines requiring
defense attorneys to possess a certain level of experience or ability in order to assume responsibility
for a death penalty case. See generally ABA, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appoint-
ment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913
(2003). Individual states may also adopt their own more guidelines. See, e.g., State Bar of Tex.,
Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, 69 TEX. B.J. 966 (2006). These national and
state-specific standards are such that newer public defender offices may not have any attorneys with
the necessary skill to handle those types of cases.
109. The LPDB Annual Board Report provides the funding information for the 42 separate
public defender districts in Louisiana. See LA. PUB. DEF. BD., supra note 107, at 19, 52-53. The
allocation of funds to each district differs by the responsibilities for which each district assumes
responsibility.
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the institution can draw from to meet its constitutional and professional
obligations only makes compliance harder.
There has been an i creased call for public defender offices to focus
their limited resources on one particular class of cases as a means of ef-
fectively dealing with insufficient resources."10 These various triage sug-
gestions usually encourage public defender administrators to focus their
limited resources on felony charges, usually capital cases, or on those
clients who are likely innocent, at the expense of misdemeanor charg-
es.11' There is "a small but vibrant literature" suggesting the opposite as a
means to "crash the system" or call attention to the unfairness of mass
incarceration and inadequate funding by encouraging every indigent de-
fendant to challenge the charges against them to the fullest extent possi-
ble.112 The same problem presents itself for offices that might choose
either of these methods as triage schemes to improve the quality of their
practice. Every indigent person, whether facing misdemeanor or felony
charges, is entitled to state- or local-funded representation, and the public
defender funding authority will undoubtedly distribute the resources in
the manner it sees fit to the organizations or entities that assume respon-
sibility for these excluded cases."3
2. Retracting the Scope of Representation
There are also significant drawbacks to limiting the scope of de-
fense representation as a method of triaging cases. Best practices encour-
age a more comprehensive legal practice than those that limit the repre-
sentation to a certain level or quality.1 4 Shifting to a model of represen-
tation that is incompatible with the model deemed best for the client im-
plicates a public defender's constitutional and professional obligations.
For example, some offices make triage decisions about whether they will
110. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Insti-
tutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 808 (2004) [hereinafter Brown, Rationing]; Brown, supra
note 29, at 207-08.
111. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 461, 467 (2007) (arguing that counsel in misdemeanor cases do not provide as significant of a
benefit to their clients as counsel in felony cases and that state should reduce counsel appointment in
misdemeanor cases to save available resources for felony cases).
112. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1096-
97 (2013). Critics have responded to this and similar proposals by claiming they are unrealistic and
tantamount to trading the best interests of both the clients facing felony charges and those facing
misdemeanors for the hope of system reform. See id. Not only would felony clients not receive any
assistance but also some misdemeanor clients would be better served through a quick guilty plea. See
id.
113. The Louisiana Public Defender Board, the statewide regulatory agency for indigent de-
fense in the state of Louisiana, has promulgated a Restriction of Services Protocol that outlines how
public defender institutions facing limited resources should reduce their responsibilities. See, e.g.,
Press Release, La. Pub. Def. Bd., Calcasieu Parish Implements Service Restriction,
http://lpdb.1a.gov/Serving%2OThe%2OPublic/Media/txtfiles/pdf/Recent%2OMedia/July%2027%202
01 2%20-Calcasieu%20PDO%20Restricts%20Services.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2016) (identifying the
withdrawal from 400 felony cases as the least harmful to the continuation of public defender services
within the jurisdiction).
114. For a discussion of holistic advocacy and vertical representation, see, infra Section II.B.2.
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be a holistic office, which means looking beyond the criminal charge to
other challenges a client faces that may affect their quality of life or
chances of reoffending, or whether they will be an office that only focus-
es on the criminal charge at hand.'15 The Bronx Defenders in New York
is perhaps the most well known example of a holistic public defender
office.116 The "innovative, holistic, and client-centered" advocacy that
the Bronx Defenders practice includes criminal defense services, civil
legal services, social work support, and immigration advocacy.17 Other
offices in New York operate under different parameters, choosing to
focus their efforts on the criminal charge directly affecting the client.11 8
Holistic representation is certainly more expensive and many offices
limit their representation to the criminal charge at hand in acknowledg-
ment of their limited resources.119
Holistic representation, however, is gaining awareness and populari-
ty as an effective, albeit costly, solution to the troublesome growth of the
criminal justice system.120 Mass incarceration has become a source of
constant news attention as both legislators and citizens become aware
that the cost of incarceration is both financially and morally untenable.1 21
Communities are decimated by the lack of stable parenting available
115. Orleans Public Defenders trains and requires their attorneys representation in a holistic
manner. See Our Work, ORLEANS PUB. DEFENDERS (May 22, 2015), http://www.opdla.org/what-we-
do/our-work. Their client-centered advocacy model includes a client services coordinator as well as
community partners to assist in improving client's life experience. See id. The Baton Rouge office
limits their practice to the criminal charge and any issues that relate specifically to the criminal
charge. The costs of operation at both offices differ drastically but are not clearly divided among
funds dedicated to the criminal charge and those dedicated to the more expansive client-centered
advocacy.
116. See generally DAVID FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER'S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO
OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2006) (describing the first few years of his employment with the Bronx
Defenders in New York).
117. Our Mission and Story, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.org/who-we-are/
(last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
118. Any of the five counties cited in the recent ACLU lawsuit regarding the state of New
York indigent defense could be examples of public defender offices that do not practice holistic
advocacy. See NYCLU Press Release, supra note 26.
119. Holistic advocacy has expanded in the last decade. For an example of another innovative
public defender office that practices holistically. See Our Vision and Mission, NEIGHBORHOOD
DEFENDER SERV. HARLEM, http://www.ndsny.org/index.php/about-us/our-vision-and-mission/ (last
visited Sept. 18, 2015). The director of the office, Robin Steinberg, travels to educate other public
defenders on the benefits of holistic advocacy and provide guidelines for implementing holistic
advocacy in their individual jurisdictions. See Robin Steinberg, BRONX DEFENDERS,
http://www.bronxdefenders.org/staff/robin-steinberg/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
120. See Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon's Call in the Twenty-First Century: Holistic De-
fense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961, 963 (2013).
121. See, e.g., Editorial, End Mass Incarceration Now, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2014, at SRI 0;
Adam Gopnik, The Caging ofAmerica: Why Do We Lock up So Many People?, NEW YORKER (Jan.
30, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-america; Elizabeth
Gudrais, The Prison Problem, HARV. MAG. (Mar.-Apr. 2013),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/03/the-prison-problem; Chris Hedges, Why Mass Incarceration
Defines Us as a Society, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-
places/why-mass-incarceration-defines-us-as-a-society-135793245/.
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because of incarceration.12 2 Children often find themselves subject to the
welfare or delinquency system because a parent is absent due to recur-
ring, or a significant length of, incarceration.1 23 Any public defender of-
fice that declines to practice holistically in order to manage limited re-
sources may find itself expending more resources in the long term as it
deals with both reoffending clients and the children who may follow in
their parents' footsteps.124 Additionally, even if an offender's child does
not require indigent criminal defense services in the future, a broken
home may require more state support in other noncriminal justice related
areas, such as housing, unemployment, or medical care.125 All of these
methods of state-supported care further reduce state budget amounts
available for resourcing indigent defense.
The ABA has also encouraged holistic advocacy as a model of rep-
resentation for effective public defense delivery systems.126 The ABA
holds the primary responsibility for establishing the legal profession's
ethical standards.127 Declining to practice holistically may help an office
and its attorneys more easily provide the cursory or surface-level repre-
sentation that is facially required to pass constitutional muster, but it will
make it fall short in meeting any other description of defense advocacy
that includes collateral circumstances and community improvement.
Nonholistic advocacy also calls into question whether or not a defender
office is complying with the ABA's requirements for effective and com-
petent advocacy.128
122. See Robin Steinberg, Addressing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System Through
Holistic Defense, CHAMPION, July 2013, at 51.
123. See Katy Reckdahl, Mass Incarceration's Collateral Damage: The Children Left Behind,
NATION (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/mass-incarcerations-collateral-damage-
children-left-behind/.
124. Participatory defense, defense representation that includes input and effort by family
members and communities, has grown in popularity because of the role it may play in reducing
recidivism. Janet Moore et al., Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the Struggle for
Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1281-83 (2014-2015).
125. See Reckdahl, supra note 123.
126. Holistic advocacy has become a frequent part of ABA publications and conference semi-
nars. See, e.g., Four Pillars of Holistic Defense, CTR. FOR HOLISTIc DEF.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/criminaljustice/FourPillarsHolisticDe
fense.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2015); Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Pro Bono &
Pub. Serv. et al., Request for Proposals, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_services/2014/04/equal-justice-
conference/2015 rfpjguidelines.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2015); Dan Wiessner, Reu-
ters Legal: ABA Urges Criminal Defense Lawyers to Embrace Holistic Approach, BRONX
DEFENDERS (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.bronxdefenders.org/bxd-in-the-news-aba-urges-criminal-
defense-lawyers-to-embrace-holistic-approach-reuters-legal/.
127. See Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
128. Some judicial districts have implemented solutions to the excessive caseload problems
that make the criminal justice system unfair for poor defendants that have proven just as startling as
the caseload averages. Courts in Mississippi and Georgia, for example, have recently faced signifi-
cant media attention for incorporating solutions that are not consistent with the Sixth Amendment's
mandate for effective assistance of counsel. See Campbell Robertson, In a Mississippi Jail, Convic-
tions and Counsel Appear Optional, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2014, at Al5; Bill Rankin, Lawsuit Tar-
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The same can be used for public defender institutions that respond
to insufficient resources by practicing horizontal representation, as op-
posed to vertical representation. In horizontal representation, also re-
ferred to as "stage" representation, defenders are assigned to courtrooms
rather than cases, and the attorney in a particular courtroom is responsi-
ble for any matters appearing in court on that day.129 Some offices incor-
porate horizontal representation by limiting each defender to one stage of
the proceeding, having "defender[s] . . . handle only one particular func-
tion, such as interviewing [a client or conducting a bail] or preliminary
hearings."13 0 In an office that practices horizontal representation, a client
will have contact with a minimum of two attorneys and can often receive
representation by up to a half a dozen, or more, attorneys during the
course of the criminal case.31 Vertical representation differs from hori-
zontal representation in that the client is represented by the same attorney
throughout the entire criminal case, sometimes even on appeal.132
Horizontal representation is common in public defender jurisdic-
tions, but vertical representation is more beneficial to an individual cli-
ent. The continuity in representation that is a hallmark of vertical repre-
sentation allows the client and attorney to build trust and openly com-
municate.133 Horizontal representation can also lead to serious errors or
even incompetent representation because it discourages personal respon-
sibility and rests on the quality of transferred notes and other case infor-
mation from attorney to attorney.134 Similar to the discourse surrounding
holistic representation, the ABA has promulgated that model public de-
fender systems use vertical representation in their practice, and to do
otherwise is a detriment to the client and the client's right to the effective
assistance of counsel.135 Even the Bureau of Justice Assistance, under the
gets Georgia Public Defender Office, ATLANTA J.-CONST., (Jan. 7, 2014, 5:38 PM),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/lawsuit-targets-georgia-public-defender-office/ncfWm/. These
districts have been charged with engaging in "assembly line justice" whereby groups of defendants
enter guilty pleas en masse or judges are allowed to remain on the bench even though they unconsti-
tutionally withhold defense counsel from incarcerated clients for weeks in order to reduce the strain
on public defender resources. See Robertson, supra; Rankin, supra. Judge Gordon explains his
practice denying counsel to indigent defendants until after an indictment as a tool to prevent the
public defenders from spending time and money investigating a case that may not even go forward.
See Robertson, supra. The four counties named in the Georgia lawsuit were accused of processing
adult defendants and allowing juveniles to go unrepresented in court proceedings. See Rankin, supra.
129. See Malcolm C. Young, Providing Effective Representation for Youth Prosecuted as
Adults, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE BULL., Aug. 2000, at 3,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/182502.pdf.
130. Mounts, supra note 86, at 484.
131. Id.
132. Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1254 (2006).
133. See id. at 1254-55
134. Id. at 1255.
135. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-6.2 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 3rd ed. 1992). The majority of state public defender programs have written policies
establishing at least some level of vertical representation. As per the 2007 census, 71 percent of the
county-based public defender offices provided primarily vertical representation for clients in felony,
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premise that vertical representation would not be possible in every juris-
diction, advised that each juvenile defender office attempt to incorporate
some degree of vertical representation in its practice by assigning "[a]
student, intern, or social worker ... to [each] juvenile" client who would
then be knowledgeable enough to brief any newly assigned attorneys.136
Choosing to practice horizontal representation as opposed to vertical
representation may reduce the need for individual public defenders to use
triage to manage their caseload, but it also contradicts the best practices
outlined by the governing authorities of the criminal justice system and
places clients at risk of subpar, or even completely deficient, defense
representation. Individual public defenders, and the institutions that
house them, look to the constitutional and professional rules that are out-
lined in Section I(B) for governing principles.'37 As demonstrated in the
previous section, limited resources force public defenders to engage in
triage practice, but the way it is currently done at the individual and or-
ganizational levels leads to serious problems that implicate attorney
burnout and arbitrary decision-making.138
Navigating the difficult terrain of providing quality representation
in an environment that only guarantees funding for effective representa-
tion can be incredibly frustrating for enterprising public defender sys-
tems.139 Not only does the individual defender lose the autonomy that is
considered the hallmark of professionals by becoming a victim to forces
outside of her control, but both the defender and the defender system also
limit the effect individual practice can possibly have on criminal law and
procedure. Much has been written about an indigent client's perception
of their free lawyer as being of a lesser quality, or less beholden to the
client, than a lawyer the client would pay.140 Public defenders are also at
risk of adopting the same mindset when they informally incorporate tri-
noncapital cases. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 6 (2010),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf; see also LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR.,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, at 8
(2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf.
136. Young, supra note 129.
137. See discussion supra Section I.B. .
138. For implications of various public defender distribution decisions, see discussion infra
Part Ill.
139. See, e.g., Tom Robertson, Minnesota Lawyers Frustrated over Shortage of Public De-
fenders, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 30, 2003),
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/09/30_robertsontpdshortage/.
140. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness:
Self-Selection by the "Marginally Indigent," 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 230, 247 (2005); Floyd
Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the
Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 368-69 (1991); STEVEN K.
SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE 4 tbl.7 (1996),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf (reporting the 69% of clients who paid for their representation
through private funds met with their lawyer within a week of their arrest while only 47% of those
who were represented by govemment-paid attorneys could claim the same).
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age into their practice. 141 When the client is unable to pay for specific
services or withhold payment for unacceptable service, it is easy to dis-
regard the client's role as the primary recipient of a valuable service.
That is an even stronger tendency when the defender trades upon the
services one client may be entitled to in order to provide services to an-
other client. As opposed to operating as a professional, who is rendering
valued services, the defender is subject to forces beyond his control-the
presence of other clients in need-with no professional rubric to use in
determining which client receives which necessary services and when.14 2
Failing to consider certain fundamental objectives of the public defense
function further removes a public defender institution and its attorneys
from a legal practice that complies with their constitutional and profes-
sional obligations.
Failing to consider how best to manage a resource so that it is per-
petually available or capable of regenerating itself to maximum utility,
only further contributes to the lack of available resources caused by an
inadequate funding stream. While it is true that some resources may not
be able to sustain themselves when they are not originally an adequate
amount to achieve their objective, certain triage decisions are better for
the maintenance of resources than others.143 An enterprising public de-
fender institution must make sure it adopts the triage system that is most
beneficial to it in the long-term. The four public defender institutions
detailed in the following sections have made four different decisions
regarding the distribution of the limited attorney-experience resource and
these decisions implicate their effectiveness in a variety of ways.
III. FOUR APPROACHES TO DISTRIBUTING THE ATTORNEY RESOURCE
One very important public defender resource that is often in short
supply in public defender institutions faced with overwhelming need and
limited resources is attorneys with practice experience.' While it is true
141. Professionalism is marked by civility in the practice of law. Haphazard approaches to
providing subpar representation to client's who may have their life or liberty on the line implicates
an attorney's understanding of his or her role in the legal process. See Michael Davis, Professional-
ism Means Putting Your Profession First, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 342-44 (1988).
142. This is primarily because there are no formal public defender ethic guiding triage deci-
sions. For different scholarly opinions, see discussion supra Section I.A. For different public de-
fender institutional approaches, see discussion supra Section II.B.2.
143. Expert witness fees might be an example of resources that are too finite to sustain regard-
less of the triage scheme used. Dispensing those fees on a contractual basis instead of through indi-
vidual hires could be considered a triage decision that proves more efficient.
144. See Rapping, supra note 76, at 173-74. The attrition rate for public defenders nationwide
was 10% in 2007 with Virginia having the highest at 24%. LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 135, at
18. Several scholars have advocated for public defender administrators to focus hiring on newer,
inexperienced attorneys as a way to improve indigent defense. This follows from the fact that many
of the public defender institutions that fall prey to the "ordinary injustice" claims set forth by authors
such as Amy Bach are older attorneys who have become accustomed to the status quo. "Ordinary
injustice" occurs when legal professionals become so used to inadequate and often appalling rights
violations that they fail to see their role in providing such subpar representation. See AMY BACH,
ORDINARY INJUSTICE: How AMERICA HOLDS COURT 2 (2009).
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there is no consensus on the legal skills necessary for effective assistance
of counsel, there are few system stakeholders who would argue that de-
fender experience is not a valuable component.145 The more experience a
defender has, the better the defender is at making quick assessments of
certain issues in cases, seeing general patterns to pursue, and developing
an effective and efficient method for pursuing them.146 Experience also
enables a defender to more accurately evaluate how a particular decision-
maker-prosecutor, judge, probation or parole officer, or jury-will treat
a particular defense or explanation for certain types of conduct. It is for
these reasons that few clients would reject an attorney with substantial
practice experience in favor of an attorney with little or no experience.
The attorney is often considered the primary resource of a public
defender institution.147 Although subsequent case law has interpreted the
Sixth Amendment mandate of effective assistance of counsel as includ-
ing investigation, interpretation, or mitigation services, all of these fall
under the umbrella of the right to an attorney.148 The manner in which a
public defender institution distributes attorneys with experience to clients
is central to the ability of the client to obtain a fair criminal process. The
more highly functioning public defender institutions used a combination
of the three avenues for experience-training, guidance, or mentorship
by a senior attorney, and completion of the defender's own cases-as
tools for evaluating or assigning experience levels to an attorney.'49
145. See ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 3. This is particularly true in newer public de-
fender offices or systems. The dearth of experienced attorneys exists because new offices must
engage in values-based recruitment in order to truly reform a broken or ineffective public defender
office and establish an office culture that values client-centered representation. The reform-minded
public defender leader must identify candidates who are the most receptive to the agency's new and
improved values and the values-based training that should accompany the change in mission. Once a
leader has identified attorneys who are receptive to pursuing this change, the leader must instill these
values and ensure that these l ssons are reinforced and internalized through training. The experi-
enced public defenders in broken systems are often unaware of the value and necessity of a client-
centered approach to indigent defense representation because they were neither trained on nor prac-
ticed in such an environment. Those who study organizational change note that resistance from those
who are asked to alter their approach or practice is a major problem in creating change. Accordingly,
experienced public defenders in a broken system may see a commitment to change and a new client-
centered form of representation as a comment on their competence. See Rapping, supra note 76, at
173-74.
146. A public defender can gain experience in a number of ways: training, guidance or mentor-
ship by a more senior attorney, or completion of the defender's own cases.
147. This claim is self-evident because indigent defense is about legal representation. Regard-
less of how important investigation, expert witness testimony, or administrative services may be to a
successful defense team, there can be no effective assistance of counsel without an attorney. The
Strickland standards for Sixth Amendment violations begin and end with the role, the function, and
the ability of the attorney to provide representation. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th
Cir. 1988).
148. See ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 3.
149. The Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia is widely considered one the of
the best public defender offices in the country, serving as a model for indigent defense throughout
the nation. See THE PUB. DEF. SERV. FOR THE D.C., ANNUAL REPORT 1-5 (2012) [hereinafter PDS
ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.pdsdc.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/fy-2012-
pds-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=0. Their training program is expansive and can be accessed at PDS
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Some offices that suffer from significant resource deficiency may disre-
gard formal training programs and instead rely on the defender's own
natural abilities or the informal guidance by other more senior attor-
150neys.
Public defender institutions primarily distribute attorney experience
to clients in three ways. Some public defender offices pay little attention
to the amount of experience an attorney has and simply assign clients or
cases at random or through some type of scheduled pickup process for
the attorney. These institutions will often assign public defenders to a
particular courtroom and hold that the public defender is responsible for
any cases, regardless of severity, that are assigned to that courtroom.1 52
Other public defender institutions use an attorney's experience level to
guide case assignments.153 These offices categorize the level of legal
experience a particular client or charge requires for effective assistance
of counsel and then assign those clients to attorneys who possess the
requisite experience.'5 4 For example, a public defender office could de-
cide that an attorney only needs six weeks of training in order to provide
effective assistance of counsel for a client facing a simple misdemeanor
charge.'55 A final group of public defender institutions distribute attorney
experience in a form that mirrors attorney specialization, either in the
particular stage of the proceeding or the particular type of case.156 Such
an institution may determine that homicide or rape cases are the exclu-
sive domain of a certain group of attorneys.'5 7
Training Programs, PUB. DEFENDER SERV. FOR D.C., http://www.pdsdc.org/professional-
resources/pds-training-programs (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
150. See Rapping, supra note 28, at 331-33. For a discussion of ineffective public defender
training models, see Rapping, supra note 76.
151. These type of distribution schemes will usually still consider separate public defender
assignments for clients facing capital offenses so as to ensure compliance with the Supreme Court's
description of "death as different" when it comes to the requirements of effective assistance of
counsel.
152. See, e.g., Public Defender Frequently Asked Questions/Client Assistance, COUNTY
DUPAGE, https://www.dupageco.org/PublicDefender/30835/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) [hereinafter
Client Assistance]. The DuPage and Will County Public Defender Offices in Illinois are two exam-
ples of public defender institutions that use this form of representation. Id.; FAQ's: Can I Choose
Which Assistant Public Defender I Want to Represent Me?, OFF. WILL COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER,
http://www.willcountypublicdefender.com/faqs/1 12-can-i-choose-which-assistant-public-defender-i-
want-to-represent-me (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). The Orleans Public Defenders used this form as
well before adopting a reformed approach where experience was taken into account in 2009. LEWIS
& GOYETTE, supra note 52, at 40-A1.
153. For a discussion of The Orleans Public Defenders as an example, see infra Section III.B.
154. For a discussion of The Orleans Public Defenders as an example, see infra Section III.B.
155. See PDS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 149, at 5.
156. LA. PUB. DEF. BD., supra note 107, at 283. This form of specialization appears facially
similar to horizontal representation but differs in that one attorney is responsible for an individual
client's entire case and not just a particular portion of it.
157. The public defender office in Lake Charles, Louisiana, uses this form of representation.
For detailed information, see the Louisiana State Public Defender Report. Id.
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A. Courtroom Based Representation (DuPage County, Illinois)
Some public defender institutions, such as the one in DuPage Coun-
ty, Illinois, do not use experience to inform case assignments and instead
require attorneys to handle any type of case or charge they are assigned.
DuPage County uses a courtroom assignment model, where a particular
defender is assigned to a particular judge or a specific courtroom.58 That
assigned public defender is then required to handle all clients or charged
offenses in that section of court or before that particular judge.159
Defense representation is a skill that improves with experience, and
failing to use experience to inform the assignment practice leaves a client
at risk of obtaining subpar or ineffective representation.'6 0 Additionally,
clients are not ordinarily assigned to a particular courtroom upon ar-
rest.161 Although an individual is able to retain a private attorney to rep-
resent him or her any time after being taken into custody, DuPage Coun-
ty does not currently provide a public defender to a similarly situated
indigent defendant until formal charges have been filed. 162 In this county,
the district attorney has thirty days, if the defendant is in custody, from
the defendant's arrest to indict the individual or conduct a preliminary
hearing that would replace the need for a formal indictment."' If the
accused is out of custody, the district attorney has sixty days to complete
either option. I6 This means that clients can remain in jail for thirty days
without an attorney representing their interests. An enterprising public
158. Client Assistance, supra note 152. "There are 102 counties in Illinois and each county
operates its criminal justice system independently." JUNAID AFEEF ET AL., POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2012),
http://www.icjia.org/assets/pdf/ResearchReports/Policies-andProcedures-of theIllinoisCriminal
JusticeSystemAug2012.pdf. Some indigent defender assignment systems use a "wheel" to assign
cases whereby an attorney is selected through a lottery method and assigned to a case with little
attention paid to the attorney's level of practice experience. See Bill Piatt, Reinventing the Wheel:
Constructing Ethical Approaches to State Indigent Legal Defense Systems, 2 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 372, 388-90 (2012). These types of public defender systems do not have
an attorney assigned to a particular courtroom and may just rely on the services of private counsel to
accept appointments for all indigent clients. See id.
159. See Client Assistance, supra note 152. In some jurisdictions, such as the Lake Charles
Public Defenders in Lake Charles, Louisiana, certain attorneys only represent clients facing misde-
meanor offenses or city court charges. LA. PUB. DEF. BD., supra note 107, at 283. There are also
attorneys who only handle certain types of cases such as sex offenses, drug offenses, mental health
offenses or offenses risking the maximum punishment of life incarceration or death. See id.
160.
Counties throughout the state of Nevada have been cited for assigning attorneys to seri-
ous felony and murder cases for which the attorney is not qualified. Most recently, the
9th Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a defendant who was exonerated from death row af-
ter fourteen years to sue the Clark County (Las Vegas) public defender administrator for
appointing an attorney just out of law school who had never handled a murder case to
represent him on capital charges.
Gideon Reviewed: The State of the Nation 40 Years Later, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N,
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender-Gideon/Gideon Reviewed (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
161. Cf AFEEF ET AL., supra note 158, at 10 (explaining the court's role in the criminal process
and noting that certain crimes are only adjudicated in certain courts).
162. See id. at lL.




defender office may assign an attorney at arrest, but if the process focus-
es on assigning representation by courtroom, every client may not have
the same attorney at arrest that they will have assigned to them once
charges have been formally filed.
Although not an entirely horizontal system of representation, this
type of distribution scheme is counter to Principle 7 of the ABA's guide
for an effective indigent defense delivery system. Principle 7 describes
the ideal representation as being one where the same attorney represents
the same client throughout the criminal proceedings.16 5 As discussed
previously, horizontal representation places a client at risk of having
gaps in time without any representation. The importance of an attorney to
a fair process is critical at every stage of the proceeding, and adopting a
distribution scheme that allows for gaps in representation undermines a
fair criminal process.
One popular argument used by proponents of this representation
scheme is that there are moral implications to allocating scarce resources
according to any system other than random selection.'66 Any allocation
of resources should be equitable or just, and the targeted distribution of
certain resources can easily move from equitable terrain to a favored
mode of practice that relies on unconscious bias. Adopting a random
distribution scheme, however, could also be considered morally objec-
tionable. Acknowledging the special needs of certain clients or charges
would, in fact, be considered necessary for an equitable distribution and
a fair process in the criminal justice system. For example, an individual
may need additional attention or resources in the form of expert witness
assistance or scientific testing to ensure they are provided the same level
of adequate and effective representation as an individual who does not
need either. Ignoring the difference in station or existence could be con-
sidered a dereliction of duty to provide effective assistance of counsel.
B. Minimal Standards Distribution (Orleans Parish, Louisiana)
The Orleans Public Defenders in Louisiana uses a distribution
scheme that provides clients with an attorney who possesses the minimal
level of training or experience deemed necessary to protect the client's
rights.167 Charged offenses are placed into one of five categories ranging
from those with the lowest potential punishment, up to six months in jail
for misdemeanors such as simple possession of marijuana or curfew vio-
lations, to those with the highest sense of complexity.168 Attorneys are-
165. See SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE CRUCIBLE OF ADVERSARIAL TESTING: ACCESS TO
COUNSEL IN DELAWARE'S CRIMINAL COURTS, at v (2014),
http://sixthamendment.org/6ac/6AC delawarereport.pdf. The entire state of Delaware actually
practices horizontal representation. Id.
166. Tremblay, supra note 78, at 2484-85.
167. See LEWIS & GOYETTE, supra note 52, at 40-41.
168. See id. at 27-28.
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assigned a class level based on the amount of criminal defense experi-
ence they have acquired.'6 The Level One attorneys are the attorneys
with the least amount of experience in the office, usually less than one
year, and represent clients facing misdemeanor charges.17 0 The Level
Five attorneys are those attorneys in the office with the highest amount
of experience, at least four years, and represent clients facing the highest
possible noncapital charges. '7 Levels Two through Four consist of attor-
neys with increasing amounts of experience and are assigned cases with
corresponding increases in case complexity.172 This system slightly mir-
rors the rotating courtroom assignment system used in jurisdictions like
Santa Barbara County, but it differs in that public defenders are not ro-
tated back through less serious offenses.
Once these less experienced attorneys achieve a modicum of suc-
cess or skill in a certain class of cases, client demands encourage leader-
ship to immediately move these attorneys "up the ladder" to handle more
complex cases. It is hard to find fault in this system because hiring new
attorneys to handle lower level misdemeanor cases, or any noncomplex
cases that require little experience, is much more easily done than hiring
attorneys qualified to handle the higher level and more complex felony
cases.173 When the facts and circumstances are simplistic or potential
penalties are limited, the amount of experience an attorney has seems
less important. Additional benefits of this type of approach are that it
would ensure all clients receive a basic level of representation and also
allows the attorneys to ease into representing defendants charged with
more complex offenses and risking stricter punishments more comforta-
bly.
If attorneys are also faced with constantly representing new and
more complex cases, they are more likely to exist in a constant state of
stress over learning new elements of a charge or investigative and repre-
sentative techniques.174 Disillusionment and fatigue may more easily take
hold in public defender disposition or approach to the professionalism of
the work. The benefits of financial and temporal investment in recruiting
and training new attorneys cannot be fully realized if these new attorneys
169. See id. at 9, 27-28. One could imagine that prosecutorial experience could be used in lieu
of defense experience because of the trial skills that are developed on either side. Attorneys have to
advise defense clients of constitutional rights, however, so the transfer may not be a clear match.
170. See id. at 12, 28 (stating that the OPD case assignment system "intend[s] to match the
seriousness of the case with the practice level and experience of the attorney").
171. Id. As noted earlier, Orleans Public Defenders did not historically accept capital cases and
only recently established a small division to assume responsibility of a handful of defendants facing
capital charges. See id. at 45.
172. See id. at 9.
173. More experienced public defenders may find it difficult to transition to a more client-
centered form of representation. See Rapping, supra note 76, at 173-74. This may be due to a num-
ber of reasons including a lack of training in that area and a need to experience their previous de-
fense work as acceptable and not deficient. See id.
174. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century,
58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 85-89 (1995).
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leave their employment with the public defender's office in significant
numbers because of the desire to seek the type of work they feel they can
conquer or to develop a particular skill. Some attorneys may actually
prefer a fast-paced movement through different levels of cases. This type
of change ensures that the work will vary and the attorney will use dif-
ferent skills at different times. This pattern of growth will face the same
eventual pitfall when the attorney reaches the highest level of representa-
tion. The only difference is the attorney will reach that stage sooner
without nearly the same level of expertise as they would have obtained
for less complex cases.
In such a scheme, all but the highest level of cases receive represen-
tation by an attorney with just the minimum level of experience neces-
sary to represent their charges. The lower level misdemeanor clients do
not have the benefit of representation by an attorney with years, or even
decades, of experience, and the same holds true to varying degrees for
the classes in between the lowest and highest classes. This result actually
limits the influence a public defender office can potentially have on the
criminal justice system or its community. In 2007, forty percent of the
nation's criminal justice system was made up of low-level misdemeanor
offenses with the smallest percentage of cases consisting of those facing
the highest potential punishments, so the impact of representation in
those cases has the most effect in a given community.'75 Preventing those
clients from having access to attorneys with the highest levels of experi-
ence limits the potential impact that defense could have in improving the
criminal justice system.
C. Rotating Courtroom Assignment (Santa Barbara County, California)
The Santa Barbara County Public Defenders uses a rotation system
for its attorney experience resource.176 When newer and more inexperi-
enced attorneys are first hired by the administration, they are first as-
signed less serious offenses.77 Once they have achieved a certain level of
experience, they become eligible to represent clients charged with high-
er-level offenses.17 8 Only after having obtained a certain level of experi-
175. LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 135, at 10. The exponential growth of misdemeanor
charges in the criminal justice system has been well chronicled in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Rob-
erts, supra note 112, at 1090. This shift was based in large part on a zero-tolerance policing theory
referred to as the "broken windows theory." Id. at 1091-92. The "broken windows theory" states that
monitoring certain urban environments to prevent smaller offenses creates a sense of law and order
that prevents serious crime from occurring. See id.
176. See Santa Barbara Cty. Grand Jury 1997-1998, Final Report on Public Defender Depart-
ment, SANTA BARBARA CTy. GRAND JURY (June 1, 1998), http://www.sbcgj.org/97-
98/MPUBLICDEFENDER.html.
177. See Santa Barbara Cty., Deputy Public Defender I-III, GOVERNMENTJOBS,
https://secure.govemmentjobs.com/viewjob.cfm?JoblD=247066 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
178. See id. As discussed in supra note 157, the distribution scheme in Lake Charles, Louisi-
ana, occupies an area in between the courtroom assignment model of DuPage County and the rotat-
ing courtroom assignment model of Santa Barbara County. The Lake Charles Public Defenders
assigns public defenders to individual courtrooms. It deviates from the courtroom assignment model
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ence representing clients charged with low-level felony offenses are the
attorneys allowed to represent clients charged with more serious felony
offenses. The attorneys are then rotated through different types of cases
at the discretion of the public defender administrator.
Even with this type of rotation system, there is no formal process
for clients facing less serious misdemeanor charges to obtain representa-
tion by the more highly experienced attorneys in the office. This assign-
ment process is a game of chance where the lower-level misdemeanor
client might obtain representation by the more experienced person but
that same client could also be assigned the least experienced person. In
fact, because new hires are assigned only misdemeanor offenses, a mis-
demeanor client who is able to obtain representation by a more experi-
enced attorney could still be considered the exception and not the rule.
D. Practice Specializations (Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Georgia)
Specialization is often preferable in the criminal defense context,
especially when considering certain protected classes or characteristics of
the available dispositions, such as juvenile representation, immigration
consequences, or capital punishment.179  These types of distribution
schemes are supported by the general knowledge that certain types of
cases, such as juvenile, sex offense, or capital cases, require specialized
skills. 1o Holistic advocacy, done properly, actually rests on having spe-
cialized individuals on each defense team. Specialized distribution, how-
ever, has many of the same consequences a a more default, courtroom-
based distribution scheme.
by creating a "life without parole" specialization for attorneys who are assigned any life without
parole cases that arise in the jurisdictions regardless of the courtroom to which the case is assigned.
LA. PUB. DEF. BD., supra note 107, at 283. The office also has specific attorneys who are tasked with
representing misdemeanors. Id. at 18. For each of these categories there is no elevation process but,
instead, the attorneys are hired for a particular role be it misdemeanor attorney, courtroom specific
felony attorney or a life without parole attorney, and the attorney is dedicated to that case subject
matter for the entirety of their employment unless they apply for and are hired for another position.
See id.
179. There may be an even more marked shift towards more specializations in the wake of
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). In Padilla, the Court found that, for there to be a valid
conviction, defense counsel must provide access to immigration advice. See id. at 374. This decision
has tasked defense attorneys with a "responsibility to consult others and create an effective defense
team." Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1515, 1517 (2011). Before Padilla, public defender organizations experimented with various
methods for delivering the best service to clients facing immigration consequences as a result of
their criminal charges. See id. at 1531-33. Some of those methods involved contracting out the
immigration work to specialists outside the organization; others entailed bringing the immigration
expertise inside the organization, either through placing experts in a single state-level position or by
sending immigration experts to local offices. Id. at 1532-33.
180. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012) (discussing the importance
of understanding adolescent development in the sentencing of a juvenile); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 78 (2010) (discussing the importance of understanding adolescent development in the
sentencing of a juvenile).
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The Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, divides all of the
cases into one of three tracks: noncomplex, standard, and complex.18'
Noncomplex matters consist of "non-violent, lower level felony offenses
including drugs, theft," and property crimes, and "are 'fast-tracked'
through the criminal justice process" with a sixty-three day timetable
between arrest and final disposition.182 Burglaries and aggravated as-
saults belong on the standard track.18 3 The remaining cases, which range
from terroristic threats to armed robbery, are in the complex division.184
There is also a juvenile court division. Attorneys in the Fulton County
Public Defenders Office are assigned to the particular divisions based on
experience but do not necessarily transition between the divisions.Iss
Such a distribution scheme also does little in furtherance of ensur-
ing a fair process for defendants by requiring a fair share of limited re-
sources. Attorney burnout, which can also be thought of as "resource
fatigue," can occur much more readily when an attorney is tasked with
representing the same type of case continuously or has no hope for im-
proved assignments. Also, expertise in particular types of cases is com-
plimented by new ideas and the fresh perspectives that may result from
having an attorney, who does not specialize in a particular type of case or
charge, responsible for the representation.
IV. RECLAIMING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY REASSESSING
DISTRIBUTION
Although each of the four counties adopt certain distribution
schemes to handle caseload concerns, each pays insufficient attention to
the resource preservation and intrinsic fairness that are fundamental
goals of the public defender practice. The discussion has provided im-
portant examples of how this failure undermines the overall public de-
fender goal of providing effective assistance of counsel and a fair crimi-
nal process for the nation's poor defendants. Incorporating resource
preservation practices and system accountabilities to limit arbitrary deci-
sion-making are two critically important changes to make for the im-
provement of indigent defense delivery systems. Public defenders will
find it difficult to accomplish their prescribed objectives without these
changes.
181. See About the Office of the Public Defender, FULTON COUNTY, GA.,
http://www.fultoncountyga.gov/fcpubd-about (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); see also Matthew A.
Sorensen, EVALUATION OF THE FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT'S CRIMINAL NON-COMPLEX
CASE MANAGEMENT DIVISION 12 (2007),
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%2Careers/CEDP%2OPapers/2007/Sore
nsen CriminalDCM.ashx; cf Trial, OFF. FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT AT'Y,
http://www.atlantada.org/divisions/prosecution units/trial.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
182. Trial, supra note 181.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. About the Office of the Public Defender, supra note 18 1.
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On the surface, the Atlanta Judicial Circuit appears to use a distribu-
tion scheme that more closely aligns with the fundamental public de-
fender goals of providing effective assistance of counsel while preserv-
ing resources and limiting arbitrary decision-making. It is deficient,
however, because it fails to incorporate attorney advancement and could
encourage attorneys to develop a rote style of representation as they rep-
resent the same type of cases repeatedly. An enterprising public defender
institution may consider adopting a set amount of time for each attorney
to stay in a particular division or level of representation in consideration
of how much time it takes a particular attorney to master the skills need-
ed for representing a particular class of cases. That public defender insti-
tution may also consider providing all attorneys with a mixed caseload or
rotating attorneys in the most complex division through the less complex
divisions to ensure those clients are provided with the most highly skilled
attorneys. This move would ensure the attorneys are not facing signifi-
cant burnout because of the difficulty managing cases at the mostly high-
ly complex level. Regardless of how a defender approaches incorporating
the three components of effective public defender triage, the institution
must ensure that every case and client are afforded serious consideration
and treated with importance.
In developing a triage scheme to "make do," public defender institu-
tions must consider more than just their legal constraints. Before the ad-
vent of public defenders, the criminal justice system was characterized
by a government-resourced, prosecuting attorney opposing a lone de-
fendant who was too poor to afford hiring an attorney with the defend-
ant's own personal financing.' Public defenders were created to inject
fairness into a criminal justice process that was growing increasingly
large and life determining.187 In order to accomplish its objectives in light
of limited resourcing, public defender institutions must make manage-
ment decisions about work priorities.188 The private sector refers to these
types of institutional decisions as organizational strategies.1 89 "An organ-
izational strategy is a coherent [plan or] idea that: 1) [clearly defines] the
purposes [or mission] of an [agency] and the value[s] [that] it is trying to
[promote]; 2) identifies [all of] the sources of support . .. that [are neces-
sary] to sustain its operations; and 3) describes how the [agency's] re-
sources . . . can best be [distributed] to accomplish the [agency's purpose
or mission]."1 90 The failure of public defender institutions and the schol-
186. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 7-8 (1964).
187. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also LEWIS, supra note 186.
188. MARK H. MOORE & BRYAN SHAHA, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS




190. Id.; see generally CAIT CLARKE & CHRISTOPHER STONE, BOLDER MANAGEMENT FOR
PUBLIC DEFENSE: LEADERSHIP IN THREE DIMENSIONS (2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bjall87768.pdf.
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arship that addresses the improvement of services comes from the single-
minded focus on the legal constraints the institution must operate under.
A superficial view of national public defender systems may lead to
the conclusion that a uniform approach to distribution practices would
not work in every jurisdiction. It is true that, as discussed in Part III pub-
lic defender services are provided in a variety of ways, and the system
used for delivery will impact the ability any system has to incorporate the
fundamental goals into its triage scheme. With the three customary mod-
els for the delivery of indigent defense services in mind, it is clear that
the comprehensive distribution scheme is best used to determine the ap-
propriate method of distributing resources to clients in staffed public
defender offices. In these staffed, full-time offices, there is one individu-
al familiar with each attorney's growth and supervision schemes that
allow the distributors to witness the individual attorney's capabilities.191
There is also one individual available to view outcomes of the distribu-
tion scheme and to ensure the practice remains consistent.'92
191. See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 105, at 6-8.
192. Much has been written about the deficiencies in the management associated with non-
public defender office models of indigent defense representation. A public defender office, as op-
posed to an assigned counsel or contract program, has "a salaried staff of full or part-time attorneys
who represent indigent defendants and are ... government employees or [the employees of] a public,
non-profit organization." LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 135, at 3. The 2007 Census of Public
Defender Offices "was the first systemic, nationwide study of public defender offices." Id. It collect-
ed "data on the staffing, caseloads, expenditures, standards and guidelines, and . . . training [pro-
grams or procedures of all of the existing state public defender programs in] 49 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia" in the year 2007. Id. The only state not included in the study was Maine, which
did not have a public defender office in 2007. Id.
In the assigned counsel model, courts usually have lists or "wheels" from which a private
attorney is chosen for a particular case. Bill Piatt, County Needs More Efficient Indigent Defense
System, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEWS (June 1, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/County-needs-more-efficient-indigent-
defense-1403588.php. An attorney's ability to get on the wheel will depend on the attorney's ability
to fulfill certain requirements, including a certain level of experience. See id. This type of system
does not lend itself to quality control and oversight. For example, under the current assigned counsel
system in one Texas jurisdiction, qualified attorneys who have submitted applications to be one of
the attorneys assigned to represent indigent clients have their names placed on a "wheel" of lawyers
who are then assigned, in order, to a client by the presiding judge for that case. Id. In this Texas
example, there are nearly 300 lawyers on the appointment list, and very little attention is paid to the
specific quality of representation each attorney provides to his or her indigent client. Id. Additional-
ly, any system that allows for the judges to control the appointment accepts the possibility that
judges may manipulate the system in determining which attorneys are placed on the wheel or grant-
ed a case assignment. Judges may also manipulate through their control of the purse strings since
they would hold the power to approve or deny payments for time spent working on a case or for
experts or investigation for a particular client. See Brown, Rationing, supra note I10, at 833. In his
article about rationing, Darryl K. Brown noted that judges and other funding allocators ration de-
fense funds by assigning public defenders or court-appointed attorneys more cases than they can
possibly handle. See id. at 812, 833-34. Courts also tend to give preferential treatment in attorney
assignments to those attorneys who resolve cases quickly, often without motion practice or investi-
gation or request for expert witness funds. Id. at 812. Even if a judge does not consciously manipu-
late this system there remains a strong potential for significant disparities in resources expended on a
particular case depending on which judge is presiding over a defendant's case.
Contract models are not without criticism. One example of a contract model exists in San
Mateo County, California, where the California Private Defender Program (PDP) bas been in place
since 1969 and holds status as the largest private defender program. Rachel Swan, Private Defense
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Additionally, the majority of public defenders in the nation today
work in large, complex organizations.'93 According to a national census
conducted in 2007, there were 957 public defender offices operating in
the United States, with 427 of those offices funded at the state level, and
530 controlled and primarily funded at the local or county level.' " The
sizes of these offices vary greatly. Public defender offices at the local or
county level employ a median of 7 litigating attorneys but the 154 offices
with the highest caseloads employed a median of 28 litigating attorneys
per office.195 Despite the prevalence of public defender offices, these
offices remain organized according to plans that emphasize the individu-
al responsibility of a single attorney for a single client. The most senior
attorneys are then assigned to the most serious felony charges.'96 Be-
cause the majority of public defender systems are large organizations that
practice vertical representation, incorporating distribution policies that
reflect more effective triage schemes dedicated to fair shares of limited
Saves Public Money in San Mateo County, EXAMINER (May 31, 2013),
http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/private-defense-saves-public-money-in-san-mateo-
county/Content?oid=2350131. In this public defender model, participating attorneys, and not the
county, pay to maintain their own office space and practices. Id. When a judge determines that a
defendant is indigent and in need of a state-funded attorney, the judge appoints the PDP. The PDP
then assigns the case to one of its private attorneys. The overall benefits of such a system, including
the amount of insight and supervision and the degree and method of accountability is unclear. See id
It is also unclear whether such privatization of the public defender function is more cost-effective
because the PDP does not record the cost per defendant. Id. The PDP's annual defender budget of
$17 million is much lower than the $34 million required for San Francisco's public defender's office
when the San Francisco population is only about 12 percent larger than that of San Mateo County.
Id. The difference in budget could reflect the reduction of best practices as defined by the ABA and
other public defender system commenters that tend to require a more significant budget. For exam-
ple, the San Francisco public defender office is able to provide services "linking defendants to social
workers" and expunging criminal resources, none of which is available in San Mateo. Id. There are
also incentive structures in private defender offices that may prove problematic. Peter A. Joy &
Kevin C. McMunigal, Does the Lawyer Make a Difference? Public Defender v. Appointed Counsel,
27 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47 (2012). For example, in order to discourage lawyers from simply processing
cases by obtaining guilty pleas, attorneys receive a high hourly legal rate which increases once a
case goes to trial. See id. Absent adequate supervision, however, even an attorney who takes cases to
trial may simply be processing cases for increased fees.
193. See LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 135, at 3-4.
194. Id. at 3.
195. See id. at 4.
196. The classes assigned for cases can range from misdemeanor to capital cases and the par-
ticular positioning of the defendant can also play an integral role. Although an attorney may under-
stand fully how to represent a misdemeanor charge, in some jurisdictions, enhanced sentencing for
multiple offenses makes a client facing a "simple misdemeanor" the type of case usually reserved for
a more experienced attorney because of the increased potential punishment. For example, in Louisi-
ana, a simple marijuana conviction carries a maximum penalty of six months in jail. Editorial,
Should Louisiana Take the "High" Road, CREOLE (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://www.thecreole.com/?p=22422. A defendant charged with a simple marijuana first offense can
receive a fine and inactive probation. This can also happen for the first few marijuana first convic-
tions. It is at the discretion of the district attorney to charge a particular defendant with a multiple
marijuana charge. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 61 (2015) (providing the district attorney
with "entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district").
Until recently, a multiple marijuana convictions could carry up to life in prison as the maximum
punishment. See Kevin Litten, Bobby Jindal Signs Marijuana Bills that Reform Criminal Penalties,
Medical Marijuana Access, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 29, 2015, 4:39 PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/06/bobbyjindal marijuanalaws.html.
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resources is critical to achieving permanent changes in the delivery of
indigent defense services. In this matter, equity and efficiency actually
converge to create a better system for the nation's indigent people. It also
creates a system that much more closely follows the mandate of the Sixth
Amendment by considering resource preservation and fair distribution of
limited resources to clients.
CONCLUSION
Individual public defender triage practice undermines the fair pro-
cess public defenders are meant to ensure by depending on informal pri-
oritization decisions and increasing the likelihood of public defender
burnout. If a public defender institution envisions a fair criminal process,
regardless of class, as its goal, then it must first develop a comprehensive
scheme for distributing limited resources to indigent defendants that con-
siders all of its constitutional and professional obligations. There is no
system of services that can claim to be fair if it does not first fairly allo-
cate the limited goods it provides to the individuals with competing
needs or claims.19 7 This is particularly true where unfair allocation exac-
erbates the ability of the resource to accomplish its intended objectives.
Recall that attorney expertise is not the only finite resource public
defender offices must strategically distribute. Investigative services and
administrative services are two more resources available at most public
defender offices that are necessary to the effective assistance of counsel
but are also severely limited in under-resourced institutions.198 As with
the attorney-experience resource, public defender administrators distrib-
ute these limited resources in a variety of ways. Some institutions dis-
tribute them using a team-based model, where the same investigator and
administrative person are assigned to the same attorney and assume re-
sponsibility for each case an individual attorney possesses. Others assign
investigators and administrative personnel independent of the attorney
assigned to a particular case.199 The methods used to distribute these oth-
er two limited resources are also critical to the ability of a client to re-
ceive a fair criminal process. Each of these limited resources can be
197. Economists and philosophers both consider such decisions in their fields.
198. The importance of investigation cannot be overstated, and the ABA has listed quality
investigation as one of the hallmarks of effective defense. See ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 3.
Quality investigation includes similar characteristics as quality lawyering, including experience or
expertise. The lack of quality investigative services are present in many challenged systems and
public defenders often bemoan the amount of administrative paperwork they are responsible for
completing.
199. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 120, at 1003-07 (describing the advantages of a team-
based approach to indigent defense). Nonteam based representation can occur when investigators are
hired for cases on a contract basis or subject to approval by the court. For investigative deficiencies
when investigators are subject to approval by the court, see Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of
Guilt: Systemic Factors that Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL.
W. L. REv. 263, 288-89 (2009).
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evaluated using the same analysis presented for distributing attorney
experience.
In this era of limited resources and overwhelming need, reassessing
public defender office structure is critical to maintaining some constitu-
tionally and professionally acceptable representation in the indigent de-
fense field. Undoubtedly, the primary problem of indigent defense is a
problem of insufficient funding. This Article's overall thesis is not meant
to diminish the importance of secure, stable, and sufficient funding. Nei-
ther is it meant to discount a review of mass incarceration and the role
current crime classifications and police targets involving certain margin-
alized individuals may have on increasing the amount of people in need
of public defender services. All of these reforms may be part of the con-
tinuing struggle to create a more just indigent defense system, but devel-
oping the best organizational strategies within these limits imposed by
inadequate funding is also an important action.200 Public defender admin-
istrators and legal scholars truly seeking permanent improvement of the
nation's broken indigent defense system should focus on providing indi-
gent defendants a fair share of the limited resources. This would help
alleviate some of the stress in the overburdened system and help the pub-
lic defender function regain its role of maintaining a fair criminal process
for the nation's poor defendants.
200. Neither is this Article meant to lessen the need for caseload caps. Caps on caseloads or
standards that govern the number of cases an individual can properly oversee at one time are critical
to maintaining effective assistance of counsel. If a defense system or defender leader does not im-
pose case limits on an individual lawyer, case pressures will inevitably overwhelm the lawyer and
compromise the quality of representation. Overwhelming caseloads can render even the most dedi-
cated, experienced attorneys into a simple plea machine or a system processor who cannot spend
more than a few minutes reviewing a client's case with an eye towards the easiest path of disposi-
tion.
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